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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
\~en Benedict de Spinoza was seeking for words to 
define in the best manner what the concept of God meant 
to him, he found the word 11 infiniten fulfilling the 
highest expression of the essential nature of God. 
His own concise definition is: "By God, I mean a being 
absolutely infinite." 1 Spinoza believed tha.t a being 
abaolutely infinite had to be God. There could be no 
more supremely perfect being. To be God, a being must 
have this characteristic of absolute infinitude. 
Throughout the entire system of philosophy established 
by this Jewish philosopher of the seventeenth century, 
the concept of God's infinity remains the keynote. 
Upon the point of God's necessary infinity hinges 
the entire remainder of Spinoza's system. This thesis 
deals with Spinoza's treatment of the divine infinity. 
All things flow forth from the one Supreme Being . 
This tenet is shared by the major philosophers of history. 
The Greek cosmologists sought for one basic subst ance. 
Aristotle b eli eve d in an Uncaused Cause, a Prime Mover 
that was Pure Form. Monotheistic religions look to one 
God to worship. Even polytheistic reli g ions seem to have 
1. Spinoza, ETH, I, def. v. (All references are to Spinoza's 
writings unless otherwise noted.) 
l 
on.e God who rules over the others as supreme deity. 
Spinoz~ declared that "from the necessity of the divine 
nature must follow an infinite number of things in 
infinite ways." 1 "Whatsoever is, is in God, and without 
God nothing can be, or be conceived." 2 Since all things 
must come from God, they must follow from his essential 
nature, infinitude. The proposition of God's infinity 
must be proven by Spinoza at the very outset of his 
philosophical argument, or his whole case is logically 
unsound. For this reason he devoted the first book 
of the Ethics, his principal work, and considerable 
portions of his other writings to the proof of the 
proposition that God is Absolutely Infinite. 
Spinoza conceived the universe as totally composed 
of one Substance, infinite, eternal, indivisible. The 
logical steps of the Ethics demonstrate how and why 
he believed the universe must be so. The existence of 
only one Substance was to him more than a theory. It 
bec ame a logical necessity. In the proofs offered in 
the Ethics, Spinoza demonstrated that Substance must 
be infinite. Then he proceeded to call that Substance 
God. The basic idea of the entire book concerning God 
1. ETH, I, prop. xvi. 
2. ETH, I, prop. xv. 
2 
is that God, or Substance, must be infinite. 
The idea of a universe composed of one sole Sub-
stance has been pondered by philosophers of all ages 
in the history of philosophy. Thales claimed that 
the common element of which all things are modifications 
was water. He was the first of the monists. The second 
was Anaximenes, who called the one substance air. Anaxi-
mander followed these men in a greeing that one substance 
is basic to all things, but he felt that "no object in 
our perceptual experience would fully explain the cease-
less mobility of nature." 1 He called it the Unlimited 
or the Indeterminate--the apeiron. His term has also 
been translated as the boundless. 
According to Anaximander ••• the first p rinciple is 
not water, but in the infinite atmosphere from 
which it comes in order to fructify t h e earth ••• 
Everything that exists owes its being to the 
first principle and arises from it by separation. 2 
Anaximander refused to beli eve in the traditional Greek 
gods, a n d accep ted this Boundless something as his God. 
This was the first major philosophical conception of 
God in Europe, and the germ of t h e idea which centuries 
later blossomed forth as Spinoza's primary thesis that 
the universe is composed of one infinite or boundless 
Substance which is identical with God. 
1. Cushman, BHP, I, 25. 
2. Weber and Perry, HP, 9. 
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Other philosophers continued the search for a definition 
of the one Substance. Parmenides declared that "Being " 
was t he cosmic Substance. He assumed that it was "one, 
et ernal, i mperishable, homog eneous, unchang eable, an d 
ma t erial. " 1 He made the assumption, and continued with 
explanations rather than proofs, since it was so self-
evident to him. He c onceived the universe as one whole, 
having no parts~ inasmuch as substance was indivisible. 
This too foreshadowed Spinoza's philosophy. Parmenides 
r ec ognized t h e distinction between thought and objects, 
but declared that t h ought was material, occupying space, 
and therefore an element of Substance, which was material. 
As time went on, philosophers began to distinguish between 
thought and matter more clearly, but the c onception of 
the one common source for all things remained almost 
unshak able. 
Anaxagoras conceived the ultimate reality as being 
related to mind and thought. He called it Nous, using 
the Greek word meaning mi nd or reason. 
In the beginning , t he inert and unintelligible 
elements were all jumble d tog ether ••• an indeter-
minate and inert mass. The intelli gent substance 
alone lived a distin ct life of its own . Then it 
entered the chaos a n d disen tangled it, mak ing t h e 
cosmos out of it. 2 
Th is idea is somewhat reminiscent o f t h e Genesis account 
whi ch s tates tha t t he ·"earth was with out fo r m a nd v oid 11 .3 
1 . Cu shman, BHP, I, 1 4 2. - 3 . Genesis .1:2. 
2. Weber and Perry, HP, 32. 
4 
Socrates and Plato followe d this idea that Mind was the 
ultimate, enlarging upon it considerably. Plato's concept 
of the Nous involved the idea of the Good. He ascribed 
the terms "Deity." and "World-Reason'' to the Nous. The 
Idea of the Good is not a person or a spiritual being. 
It is merely the absolute ethical end and purpose of the 
world. 1 Plato also believed that a Demiurge, or World-
forming God existed. 
In the philosophy of Plotinus, much of Spinoza's 
teaching is foreshadowed. Here is found the pantheistic 
notion of an impersonal Absolute of infinite magnitude. 
Plotinus ••• emanatistic pantheism ••• that look s 
upon the world as an overflow, as a diffusion of 
the divine life, ~~d upon its reabsorption in God 
as the final goal of existence. 2 
In the last analysis, there is but one Form, one Unity, 
one God. This divine unity is not mathematical, but 
equal to infinity and contains everything. God is Pure 
'rhought •. God. is the fund.amental reality; the world i s 
a n emanat-ion. He did not, as did ::>pinoza, as s ign attributes 
to God for that would be limiting his nature. "He is both 
everything and nothing imaginable." 3 Individual persons 
are only passing stages in the eternal scheme of things. 
1. Cushman, BHP, I, 142. 
2. Web e r and Perry, HP, 128. 
3. Ibid., 129. 
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For Plotinus, the world emanates from the one 
underlying substance, God . He denied th~t any defi-
nitive statements could be made about God , for such 
statements would limit his nature. Th"s makes God 
an abstracti on. Such is not re adily understandable 
in relation to his belief that everything is an ema-
nation from God. S e emingly, any statement made about 
the emanation would also apply to God . Windelb and 
discus~es this problem in these words: 
To Plotinus, the Godhead is t~1 e only original 
Being , superior to all oppositions, inaccessible 
to all definitive characterization, wholly un-
speakable. 1 
It creates the world out of itself in an 
eternal, timeless, and nece ssary pr ocess. It is 
present in all creatures, yet it is separate and 
distinct from plurality . 2 
Certain elements of Plotinus' thought foreshadow 
Spinoza's philosophy ; an absolute Deity i n whom all 
reality exists; this God is absolutely infinite; 
nothing outside of God and t he emanation from God 
can exist. However, Plotinus refused to assi gn a ny 
attributes to God as Spino za later did, on the grounds 
that such woul d limit God ' s infi nity. :S:ence, God is 
everything, but yet a compl e te abstraction, in the 
concept of Ploti nus. Such an abstract abs olute could 
hardly be akin to a personal deity. 
1. dindelband, HAP, 369 . 
2 . Ibid., 370. 
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Indiv iduality is not the final form of existence. 
It is merely passag e fr om God, the principle of 
t~ings, t o God, their ideal goal; from God, the 
i nfinite p ower, t o God, the absolute actuality. 1 
The concept of God and Substance was by thi s time 
definitely associated with the idea of thought and mind~ 
but among philosophers God was not considered a person. 
Spinoza did not think of God as a person, but rather 
as an impersonal being , far above the limitations of 
t hat which is called personality. He felt he a greed 
larg ely with the ancient philosophers re gard i n g the 
nature of God. 
For I hol d that God is of all things the cause 
i mmanent, as the phrase is, and not transient. 
I say that all things are in God and move in God, 
thus agr eeing with Paul, and perhaps, with all 
the ancient philosophers. 2 
These elements of ancient Greek philosophy b e came vital 
links in the chain of Spinoza 1 s thought. 
This study of Spinoza will be concerned with his 
meaning and us e of the term 11 infinity11 as applied to God. 
Since it is central in importance to his entire philo-
sophical system, the starting point will be the initial 
statement he makes in Book One of the Eth ics. Co nsideration 
will be given to his g eometric me thod of proof, the as-
sumptions he mak es at the be ginning, and the proofs 
1. Weber and Perry, HP, 131. 
2 . Letter XXI (LXXIII) to Oldenbur g . (First numeral is tha t 
used in Elwes, POS. Numeral in parenthesis refers to the ' 
edition of Spinoza 1 s Correspondence . by Van Vloten. 
7 
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employed to derive h is conclusions. Spinoza used as 
his premises what Descartes reached as conclusions~ 
alth ough he altered Descartes' ideas wh erever necessary 
to suit hi s own purposes. Spinoza 1 s concep tion of 
infinity is one of the most profound conceptions in 
philos ophy. Some elements of h is system appear to be 
contradictory, for example, hi s ideas of a necessarily 
infin ite Being , and freedom. Some parts of his proof 
of God's infinity seem c ontr~dictory as well. But 
clos e study reveals that h is proofs were very carefully 
built, and almost nece s sarily follow immedi ately from 
his premises. Thus the validity of his premises will 
be an i mportant test of his philosophy. Jus t as in a 
syllogism, the major premise must be correct to arrive 
at a v alid conclus ion. The implications of his con-
clu sions reg arding God's infin ity will fo r m the second 
test. Finally, Spinoza 1 s thought will be discussed in 
relation to other philosopher's teachings upon the same 
subject, discussions of Spinoza's theories by recent 
thinkers, concluding with a comparison with the God of 
Christianity. 
Mo s t of the inv esti gation will be bas ed upon Spinoza's 
major work , t h e Ethics, particularly in Book One, "Con-
cerning God." Many of his letters to Oldenburg , Meyer, 
Blyenbergh, and others are also valuable. The Short 
8 
r;.t 
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Treatise, written prior to the Ethics, co ntains infor-
mation about Spinoza 1 s early ideas which a pp ear more 
fully developed in the Ethics. C o~mentators on Spinoza 
in book s written especially about his ideas, such as 
Wolfson, Joachim, McKeon, and Roth, add rich t h oughts 
in analysis of Spinoza's writings. Various histories 
of philosophy written by such men as Ueberweg , ·Neber, 
Wi ndelband, Wri ght, Rog ers, Cushman and others 
will be referred to for support of the ideas to b e 
pres ented. Complete bibliogr aphical data on the se 
books will be found in the bibliography of this thesis. 
The concept of infin ity is not s p ecifically treated 
in the writing~ about Spinoza. It a ppears in connection 
with discussions of God and the attributes, but not 
as a separate topic. Wolfson's two volume work on 
Spinoza is an excellent stu dy of Spinoza's entire system. 
Fuller's History of Philosophy presents an acceptable 
analysis of the main ideas. He pictures the Spinozis t ic 
God as Reality, not a personal being as in Christianity. 
9 
His discussion o f the infinite attributes is commendable. 
Wright's History of Philosophy contains a well-outlined 
simpl e presentation of Sp inoza 1 s ideas with little criticism. 
Alfred Weber in his History of Philo s ophy advances an 
admirable critical view of Spinoza, with many ideas in 
common with the findings of this thesis. 
This will be noticed in his ideas on the intellectual 
love of God, the 'divine intellect, and the personal 
consciousness of God. Ueberweg's authoritative history 
has an enlightening analysis of the propositions on 
God in the Ethics, Book One, pointing out several 
logical fallacies therein. The Christian viewpoint 
represented in contrast to Spinoza will have Arminian 
and Wesleyan leanings, in contrast to Roman Catholic 
or Calvinistic background. Olin Alfred Curtis's theology, 
The Christian Faith, and H, Orton Wiley's Christian 
Theology in three volumes have been helpful in material 
on the Infinite Go d of Christianity. 
In order to evaluate the definition of God which 
Spinoza propounded, it is necessary to understand his 
entire philosophy and especially the terms which he chose 
to explain it. Thus, the first problem is to present the 
case as Spinoza discussed it in his writings, with a view 
to comprehending t h e arguments exactly as he meant them 
to be understood. Spinoza wrote i n Latin during the 
seventeenth century. '".ehe translation int o English, 
plus the changes in connotation of nany words through 
the years, makes an extended effort to understand Spinoza's 
term e s sential. Only as his terms become meaningful 
in the same light in which he used them will there be 
found any coherence in his philosophy. Thi s , of course, 
10 
I () 
would be true in understanding any philosophy. 
The aim of all philosophy is to find truth. Thus, 
it is our primary obligation t o defend Spinoza, 
following his arguments as he presented them, sear-
ching . for the truth to be found therein. If incoherence 
is suspected, let it be made certain that Spinoza, 
not misunderstanding of Spinoza, is the seat of that 
incoherence before accusations of error are made. 
Spinoza found God t o b e infin ite, in a very special 
sense. To understand this special meaning he at tached 
to "infinity" and to evaluate his ascription of this 
term to God in the ligh t of his own complete system 
of thought, our personal beliefs, · and the beliefs of 
philosophers other than Spinoza, finally with Christian 
doctrine, is the object of this thesis. 
l l 
Jf 
CHAPTER TWO 
THE BASIS FOR SPINOZA'S PROOF OF GOD'S INFINITY 
Spinoza's primary belie f ahout God was that God 
is an infinite being. Around this principle he framed 
his entire philosophical s ystem. The first book of 
his Ethics is given to prove that God actually is 
11 a being absolutely infinite." 1 He presented his 
arguments els ewh ere, but always in explanati on of the 
proofs offered in the Ethics, or as previous thoughts 
on the subject (as in the case of the Short Treatise}. 
First, then, consideration shall b e given to the 
definitions, axioms and propositions as set forth in 
the Ethics, Book One. 2 
Spinoza was a firm believer in the mathematical 
method for finding truth in all fields. The geometric 
method of proof formed by Euclid for probl ems of lines, 
points, and all plane fi gures became Spino za's me thod of 
proof for philosophical ideas. Spinoza considered the 
truth in h i s philosophy to be as necessary as any of t h e 
demons t rati ons of g eometry. Furthermor e , t h is met h od of 
settin g up concrete propositions supported by logica l 
"12 
p roofs is a very clear way to exp~ain and establish the 
veraci t y of a set of philosophical principles. Once certain 
1. ETH, I, def., vi. 
2. Cf. p. 1 above. 
! i / I'' 
premises are granted, t h e logical results may be derived 
from these premises, which Spinoza did, in an almost 
unsha.tcabl·e way. 
In the beginning , Spinoza presented ei ght definitions 
of terms and phrases vital to the propositions which 
wer e to follow. These definitions are for the following 
terms: (1) that which is self-caused; ( 2 ) a thin g called 
finite after its k ind;(3) substance; (4) attribute; ( 5 ) 
mode; (6) God; (7) a free thing ; and ( 8 ) eternity. The 
first definition is actually the first premise of his 
philosophy. It must precede all the others b y logical 
neces sity. Its primary idea is that there is an Uncaused 
Cause, some one source for all things, one cau se, means, 
and e s sence for all existence. Basically, then, all 
t h ings are inherent in one self-caused Being, unity in 
the universe, the negation of pluralism. It is from 
this and the succeeding definitions that he draws his 
proofs for the opening propositions of Book One. 
Other important definitions are the ones for sub-
stance, mode, and God. Spino za defined substan ce as 
"tha t 1Nhich is in itself, and is conceived through 
itself; in other words, t h at of which a conception can 
be formed indep endently of any other conception." 1 
1. ETH, I, def. iii. 
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An attribute is "that which the intellect perceives as 
constituting the es sence of subst ance." 1 It is note-
worthy that Spinoza qualifies the actuality of these 
attributes by stating they are what the intellect 
perceives to be the essence or reality of substance. 
Thus they are not necessarily the true or the only 
attributes, but only what we perc eive them to be. 
Some, however, believ e that whatever we think about 
God clearly and distinctly, is necessarily true. 
Spinoza later points out that there are only two attri-
butes known to man, thought and extension. His asser-
tion of these attributes is positive. However, Spinoza 
denies the power of men to know any other attributes 
of God. The whole knowledg e of t h e attributes is 
tempered with this conditioning st a tement that they 
are only what the intellect p erceives as constituting 
the es s ence of substance, and are not necessarily real 
if the idea in the intellect is not clear and distinct. 
A clear and distinct idea is necessarily true by virtue 
of · the necessary causal enchainment .9f ideas. 
The next definition is that of a mode: 11 the modi-
ficati ons (aff ectiones) of sub s tance, or that whi ch 
exists in, and is conceived through, something other 
1. ETH, I, def. iv. 
14 
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than itself." 1 There are finite modes and infinite 
modes. Infinite modes are referr ed to in Proposition 
XXII. In the preceding propositions he builds up to 
the idea of infi~ite modes. Proposition XXI states: 
All things, which follo w from the absolute nature 
of any attribute of God, must always exist and be 
infin ite, or, in other words, are eternal and 
infin~te through the said attribute . 2 
The attribute s of extension and thought have their 
own infinite modes. Spinoza seems to be referring to 
motion and rest as infinite modes of extension in Book II, 
Axioms i and ii. "All bodies are either in motion or 
at rest." 3 Bodies are distinguished from one another 
in respect of their motion or rest, quick ne s s and 
slmvness, and not in respect of subst ance . 4 These 
axioms follow Proposition XIII, scholium. It is sho\vn 
elsewhere that the modes of/thought which are infinite 
are ideas and volitions. Book I, Proposition XXXII 
refers to will as a necessary cause. It being necessary, 
then it belongs to the infinite modes. Proposition XXX 
mentions the infinite function of intellect, or ideas. 
Thus we have these two infinite modes of thought. By 
the next proposition, however, we might infer that love 
and desire are also infinite modes in the attribute of 
l~ ETH, I, def. v. 
2. ETH, I, prop. xxi. 
3. ETH, II, axiom i. 
4. ETH, II, axi om ii,. lemma i. 
15 
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t h ought. These modes are not absolutely infinite, but 
only infinite after thei r own k ind, infinite within 
their ovm sphere of being in the sense of b e ing all 
t h at exists of that mode. 
The most important definiti on of Book I is t h e 
definit i on of God. "By God , I mean a being absolu tely 
infinite--that is, a substance consi s ting in infinite 
attributes, of wh ich each expresses eternal and in-
finite essentiality." 1 From this definition we see 
that Spinoza uses the word infinite in the k ey position 
of the definition. It is the most expressive word used 
to describe Go d in the entire d efinition , the only term 
to a ppear more than once, b e ing used three times. 
God has infinite at t ributes, both in number and in 
scope. Infinity is ascribed to each of the attributes, 
however numerous they may be. We only know t wo of t h e 
attributes. However we cannot limit God by sayin g that 
these t wo are the only attribu tes he has. That would deny 
his infinity, accord ing to Spinoza. Nothing must be 
ascribed t o God that would in any way place a limit to 
his natu re. Furth er , we note that t h ese attributes are 
essential to the very nature of God. The attributes are 
necessary to the v ery b ei ng of God. Everything which 
follows fr om these nece s sary attributes also exists as 
1. ETH, I, def. vi. 
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necessary and infinite. From this necessity we h ave 
the infi nite modes. Thes e are distinguished from finite 
modes in Book I, Propositi on XXIV: 11 The essence of t h ing s 
pr oduced by God d oes not involv e existence." Spinoza 
stated later t ha t the order of modes follo ws a fi x ed 
order fr om the attributes of God, and .t h erefore are 
necessary in their particular form. 1 These basic 
definitions are the foundation fo r the g eome tric proof 
which follo wed in the Ethics. 
These de initions deserve s p ecial consideration in 
t h emselves before they are discussed in connection with 
the proofs of the propositions. I n the se definitions are 
the seeds of the whole system of thought. If the state-
ments and conclusions founded upon the se d e f initi ons a r e 
to b e true, the definitions must b e sound. It is not 
enough to have a logically corr ect system derived from 
the pr emises, but those premises must conform to reality, 
i.e., b e true. Thus Spinoza had to b e judiciously careful 
in forming his d efinitions. Spinoza felt that the content 
of the definitions was necessary and unavo idable. He 
derived them immediately fr om his intuitions of the truth 
of the universe. It may b e argued that Spi noza include d 
within h is definitions exactly what he aime d to prove by 
them in t he prop ositions, t h at he wa s arguing in a circl e . 
1. ETH, I, prop xxv, corollary. 
17 
But when it is considered that Spinoza believed that 
truth . followed immediately and neces sai•ily from the nature 
of thin~s, it can be understood that there was no other 
way his definitions could have been stated. The intui-
tive nature of the definitions rele gates the propositions 
to an explanatory function. The propositions are not 
given to establish the truth of the propositions, but 
to explain what their meaning is. To Spinoza, the defi-
nitions were self-evident truths. To his readers , they 
needed the support and explanation of logical proofs. 
As evidenced by the correspondence and by subsequent 
co~Jaentators on Spinoza's works, even these propositional 
proofs were not adequate for complete understanding. 
Spinoza started with the basic idea that all that 
there is, is. The first problem is to establish a causal 
agent for all existence. 11 By that which is self-caused, 
I mean that of which the essence involve s existence, or 
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that of which the nature is only conceivable as existant. 1 
This first definition is a rewording of the usual expression 
of the et.ernality of God and Substance. Of course, 
Spinoza is not yet ready to ascribe et:ernality to God, 
in the logical process of his argmnent . In effect, Spinoza 
is describing a thing which has always been in existence 
1. ETH, I, def. i. 
.. 
and cannot be conceived of as n o t existing at some time, 
past, present or future. In thinking of the be ginning 
of all things, we reason that there must have been some 
starting point. The simplest deduction is that there was 
only one self-caused thi n g that is eternally existent. 
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This has been the conclusion of Spinoza, as well as Plato, 
Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas, the ancient monists of the 
Eleatic School in Greece, and countless other philosophers. 
The Hebrew-Christian doctrine of God reveals this eternal 
oneness of the original self-caused Being . If a being 
is self-caused, it must be eternally existent, for there 
could not be a causation of a thing into existence by 
no-thing . In this first definition we find the ronfusion 
of the terms essence and existence. Spinoza goes on to 
say in Propositi on XX that God's essence and his existence 
are the same thing. It is eYident in his system th at 
a concrete explanation of these two terms, es pecially of 
essence, is needed. This is one of the elements lacking · 
in Spinoza's writings. 
In the next definition, Spinoza described the qual-
ity of finiteness. To be finite m·eans to be limited in 
some sense or other. "A t h ing is called finite after its 
k ind when it can be limited b y another thing of the same 
nature." 1 Th e distinction between thought and body 
1. ETH, I, def. ii. 
enters here in this definition through the phrase 
11 of the same nature.'' A spatial object can be limited 
in its size or greatness by another thing, but not by 
a non-spatial idea Webster defines finiteness as: 
"having definable limits; having a character or being 
completely determinable, in theory or in fact." 1 
This concept of limitation as the essence of finiteness 
and also of determination being part of finiteness, 
is comparable to Spinoza's definition. However, the 
phrase "having a character" in Webster's definition is 
not so easily reconciled with Spinoza. If character 
is a quality of finiteness, then non-character must be 
the essence of non-finiteness, or infi niteness. Such 
was the position of Plotinus. In this light, an 
infinite being must be devoid of all character, for 
to state any attributes or characteristics of God 
places limits to· his nature. Spinoza affirms the 
existence of infinite attributes of God, which place 
no limit to his infinitude. They are a determination 
of his nature that is not a ne gation. He s t ates that 
God is an absolutely indeterminate, free being , in 
other words, that h e cannot be limited by any being 
outside of himself in any way. Here lies a fundamental 
problem in the doctrine of the Infinite. How can God 
1. Webster's Coll egiate Dictionary (1949 Edition), 377. 
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be infinite, if infinitude involves indetermination 
in the sense of having no character assi gnable? But 
is this what Spinoza means? Spinoza himself speaks of 
attributes of God, of characteristics, such as love. 
Any statement relative to the nature of God is limiting 
in the sense that its opposite c ould not also be true. 
If God is rational, then he i s not irrational. If the 
universe is necessary and circumspect, it cannot be 
haphazard. God must have an es s ential nature or char-
acter. His characteristics are without finite limitations. 
Hi s is perfect character. Spinoza's idea of God's 
infin ity does not mean that God is without characte.r, 
but rather that God's character is infinite, and c a nnot 
be violated by any other substance. 
The meaning of infinity then can only refer to 
limitation by something other, in either potential or 
actual limitation. In a du alistic universe, divided 
between mind and body, the limitation of a non-spatial 
idea by a spatial body is apparently impo s sible. 
Spinoza's ans wer to this problem is complete parallelism 
between the attributes and modes. A mo de of thought and 
a mode of extension are but two ways of expressing the 
same thi ng. Any other at·tr ibutes of God would apparently 
have similar modes, all expressing the same thing in 
some different m~nner. This correlation is complete, 
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even though there is no direct intercormection, causally 
or oth erwise between the attributes, save that they are 
all attributes of the one Substance. Since each attribute 
must be conceived solely through itself, according to the 
original definition, there cannot be any vital connection 
between the attributes to explain this p arallelism. 
All of the attributes are inherent in the one Subst ance. 
Spinoz a equated the definitions of God and Sub s tance, 
for they are i dentical terms. " By subs tance, I mean 
that which is in itself, · an d is conceived through 
itself; in other words, that of which a conception can 
b e fo rmed independently of any other conception." 1 
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This impli es a being which exists because of its own power , 
h aving dependence upon nothing but its elf for cause 
and su t a:Lning energy. Evidence f r om e xperience leads 
u s to believe in the reality of Substance , for Subst a nce 
is revealed and expres sed in its modes. But subst ance is 
not determined by the nature of the modes. Modes are 
determined by Substance. Subst ance must be conceived as 
independent and prior to its modes. As Joachim states : 
11 To conceive Substanc e through the conception of its modes 
would be to conceive it as dependent fo r its being on 
II 2 their being . He also de c l ared that "all reality 
1. ETH, I, def. iii. 
2 . Cf. Joachi m, SES, 17. 
. ~· 
ultimately rests upon that which is self-dependent. 
To think Substance in its self-dependence is the only 
way to think it truly." l Spinoza assumed that there 
was only one substance in which all thi n g exist, for 
this definition. He went on then to show why his 
assumption was correct by the opening porpositions. 
He later claimed that all things are actually part of this 
one Substance, yet not a divisible part, for Substance 
cannot be divided. If Substance were divided, then 
infin ity could not belong to either part, since each 
would limit the nature of the other. This would des-
troy unity in the universe, and the infinity which is 
essential to the essence of Substance for Spinoza's 
system of philosophy. 
His Substance is really an ultimate cause, that 
one thing which depends upon nothing else for its b eing . 
If it were caused by something else, it coul d not be 
infinite because of its dependence upon that other thing 
for origination;. In trying to reduce the multiplicity 
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of t h ings in the universe to an ultimate cause or causes, 
the simplest answer is only one ultimate cause or substance. 
To go farther is to sugg est an absolute nothingness, 
which seems in the realm of absurdity. Something cannot 
be created or produced by a non-existent agent out of 
absolute nothingness. The effect necessarily depends on 
l. Joachim, SES, 16. 
i t s c ause. 1 Thus it is hi ghly unreason able to reduce 
this multiplicity of thing s to less than one ultimate 
c ause. We must have a starting point. 
Spinoz a believe d that God is the final and ef f icient 
cause of all thin gs, both of their exist ence and of thei r 
essence. 2 It is necessary that all particular thi ngs 
ex ist and act as they are c ondi tioned t o act, accor ding 
the the nature of God. Descartes held the idea that God 
is the creator of all things. The omni potent aspect of 
God's infinity, from Descartes' view, is that God is 
able to create anything which his infinite intellect 
mi ght conceive. God is grea ter than all of these created 
things, since the ultimate caus e must be gre a ter than 
the e f fect. Descartes says: 
Now it is manifest by the natural light that there 
must be at least as much re ality in the effici ent 
and total cause as in its effect; for whence can 
t h e effect draw its reality i f no t from the caus e ? 3 
Descar t e s thought that God cre a ted only ·vvhat he will ed 
to crea te. Spinoza b elieved that Go d c aused all thing s 
by the s ame nece ~ sity tha t a triangle c auses its thre e 
i nt erior angles to be equal to two ri ght an gles. He 
believed that given the cause God, the eff ects follow 
neces s arily. All modes flow from the n e cessity of God 's 
nature. Spinoza believe d that God's will, intellect , and 
1 . I mpl ied in ETH, I, axiom i. 
2. ETH, I, prop. xxv. 
3. Descartes, Meditations, III. In Rand, MCP, 137 . 
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power are identical. Hence, whatever is in God's intellect 
actually exists, for he wills it to exist and causes it 
to e.Y..i st b y his p ower simul taneeusly. 
Spinoza rejected the Cartesian idea of omnipotent 
causality on the grounds t hat if everyth ing Vli thin the 
divine omniscient intellect were created by the choice of 
the divine -.rvill, then God 1 s omnipotence woul d be destroyed, 
since God coul d crea te · riothing more. Spinoza 's own 
words are these : 
Although they conceive God as actually supremely 
intelli gent, they yet do not believe , that h e can 
bring into e xistence everything whlch he actually 
understands, for they think that t h ey wou l d thus 
destroy God's p ower. If, they contend , God has 
created everything vvhich is in his intellect, he 
would not be able to create anything more, that this 
t hey think , would clash w:tth God ' s omnipotence; 
therefore, they prefer to a s sert that God i s indiffer-
ent to all things , and that he creates noth:tng except 
that which he has decided by some absolut e exercise 
of will , to crea te. However , I think that I have 
shown sufficiently clearly (by prop. xvi.), that 
rom God's supreme power, or infinite nature, an 
infinite nu:·nber of thing s-- that is, all thin f s h av e 
necessarily flo wed forth in an infinite number of 
ways. a •• The omnipotence of God has been dis pl ayed 
from all eternity, and will for ~11 enernity remai n 
in the same state of activity. Th:ts manner of 
treating the question attributes to God an omni-
potence , in my opinion, far more perfect. For 
otherwise, we are compelled to confess that God 
understands an infinite numb er of creatabl e things 
which he will never be ab l e to create, for, if he 
created all that he understands, h 3 would , according 
to thi s showing, exraust his Olmlipotence, and render 
himself imperfect. 
1. ETH, I. prop. xvii, scholium. 
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Spino za beli eved that hi s theory wou l d preserve the 
divine omnipotence, a nd p revent it fr om the possibility 
of reachi ng t h e point of exhaustion in having created all 
that it wou l d b e pos s ible to create. He makes intellect, 
will, and power of God identical to re a ch this con-
clus ion. 
Th e problem in Spinoza ' s view h ere lies in the 
co-exist ent infinity of both God's omni potence and 
omnis c ience. An infinite cannot be exhausted, as 
Sp ino z a has well demonstr a ted tha t an infinite sub s t ance 
c a nnot b e d ivided, for an infinite portion would still 
remain. It is ther efore impo s sible that the infinite 
omnis cience could be exhauste d. by the infinite omni-
potence. Go d must be eternally acting , by his will, 
bringing int o reality tha t 1.vhich hi s i n f inite intellect 
c once i ves. This activity of the will i s difficult to 
conceive in the impersonal absolute which Spinoza calls 
God. For a personal God, the i d ea is more plausible. 
The ab solute necessitarian p os ition Spinoza holds is 
the c a.us e of this problem. 
An attribute is "tha t whi ch t he intellect p er-
ceives as c onstituting t h e es s ence of sub s tance.'i l 
Attributes are general qualities of subst ance of which 
l. ETH, I, def. iv. 
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we may have knowledg e. Spinoza sai d that we can know 
onl y two of the attributes , but there is the possibility 
in the infinite nature of God of an inf i nite number of 
other attributes , these be i ng completely unknown to our 
finit e intellects . To affirm that substance had only 
two a ttributes would limit substance, thus makinf! it 
finite. 
Each of the attributes is infinite after its kind . 
Ther e is nothin f_S to l i mit t he attribute of t hought 
insofar as i t is thought. A spatial ob j ect cannot 
limit a non-spatial idea. The attributes are con-
ceived independently of each other , and yet they 
are in complete parallelism. 11 A true idea must corr es-
pond to its ide a te or objec t ." 1 Thus , a mode of 
thought must correspond with t he mode o f exten:;lion to 
which it refers. The mode of thought is an e xpr ession 
of the same reality as the mode of ext ensi on . Yet there 
is no causal connection betwe en the attributes, and 
cannot be, i f they ar e to be conceived in themselves . 
Precisel y how this interrelation of the modes is 
achieved without interaction is a difficult problem 
in Spinoza 1 s thought . No perfectly s atisfactory solution 
to this mind-body problem h a s been mad e. 
1 . ETH, I, axiom vi . 
27 
,~· I/ 
, . 
Attributes are intangible qualities of subst a nce. 
The forms of reality with which we h e.ve immediate contact 
are the modes, or modifications of substance. A mode is 
anything which 11 exists in and is conceived through, 
something other than itself. 11 1 Thus, a chair, which 
does not exist through any power of its own, i.e., was 
not self-caused, must be classified as a mode. A wooden 
chair depends on the tree from which it was Jmde. That 
tree depends on the soil from which it grew, and the 
seed from another tree. The soil is dependent upon 
matter, which is a mode of extension, one of the attri-
butes of substance. Any object or thought may thus be 
traced by such steps back to the one ultimate substance. 
Joachim reworded Spinoza's definition of mode as "that 
which is a state of substance ••• The more we understand 
modes, the more we understand Substance; for modes are 
ways in which substance is expressed." 2 We must have 
a conception of substance indep endent of all other 
conceptions, but we may learn more about substance 
through its expressions in the modes. The f orms of 
modes do not affect the general nature of substance, 
but the modes are 11 through and through determined b y 
Substance." 3 Modes are all partial expressions of the 
1. ETH, I, def. v. 
2~ Joachim, SES, 16. 
3. Ibid. 
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total reality of substance. A mode has definite limits, 
and its nature is sp~cifl cally defined. As such it is 
2 9 
a n egation of all other things. If we call a thing an 
apple, we do not also call it an orange. All determination 
is negation of that which does not appertain to the 
specific object determined or defined. An apple is 
limited to being an apple; a triangle is limited to 
being a triangle; it is not and cannot be a circle. 
Hence they are modes and not substances. They are 
not self-caused. The particular things which are parts 
of our world of experience are all modes, modifications 
of the one substance in which all things exist. 
The sixth definition of Book I is the i mportant 
stat ement of the essence of God. Spinoza indicated 
at this point of the definitions that God and Substance 
are one and the same. In his argumentation, it would seem 
that this idea, and others as well, are sometimes 
assumed without proof. If such be true, it is only 
because Spinoza believed they were necessary ideas, the 
proof of which would be self-evident to the analytical 
reader. Moreover, the very order of the definitions 
themselves forms a compact logical system, step by step. 
Spinoza ' s whole argument is epitomized in these definitions. 
The propositions which follow are applications and ex-
planations of the truths of these definitions. It may 
be contended tha t Spinoza weighted his definitions 
heavily in favor of the arguments which he proceeded 
to prove on the basis of the definitions; and there 
seems to be some truth in this idea. However, the 
definiti ons are in themselves so logically arrang ed 
as to form a proof in themselves, when considered as 
a whol e group and not sep arately. The defini.tions · and 
propositions are : both explanations of what Spinoza'· 
saw intuitively ~s ultimate truth. · Hence it is ne-
'cessary that they should be , analyzed in terms of 
each~ other for complete· UBderstanding . 
Thus we may say that Spinoza proved the truth of 
hi s definitions in the propositions by referring to the 
definitions for support. However, in Spinoza's mi nd, 
these definitions were intuitive statements, cl ear, 
distinct, necessary ideas, which he believ ed would b e 
accep ted by think ers without formal proof. In the 
followin~ argument, however, we find that once we ac c ept 
his premi ses in the definitions, t h e proof of t he propo-
siti ons must follow n e ce s sarily. Th e test then must be 
of hi s definitions. F irst: are they s e lf-consist ent? 
Second : do t h ey conform to reality? Third : does Spinoza 
us e h i s terms c on s istently each time he uses them? Fo~rth: 
are the-:r s elf- evident? These are the critical problems· · · 
to be dealt with later . 
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Considering a gain the definition of God, let us 
analyze its phrases more carefully. This d efinition, 
as fully stated by Spinoza, reads t hus: 
By God, I mean a being absolutely infinite--that 
is, a substance consisting in infinit e attributes, 
of which each expresses eternal and i nfinite 
essentiality. 
Explanation.--I say absolutely infinite, not 
inf inite after its k ind: for of a thing infinite 
only after its k~nd, infinite attributes may be 
denied; but t h at which is absolutely i nfinite, 
contains in its essenc e whatever expresses reality, 
and involves no ne gation. 1 
The wor ds "absolutely infini te" concisely express the 
easence of this definition. The succeeding words f urthe r 
explain this phrase. Go d is declared to b e a substance 
with an infinite number of attributes, each infinite in 
its own k ind, each absolutely essential to the nature of 
God. The attributes of God hav e no beginning or ending , 
but are co-eternal with God. There was no time when the 
attributes of God were any different from what they are 
no w, and will be in the future. God is an abso~utely 
infinite being, for there is no oth e r b e ing that is in 
his class. The attributes are infi n ite after their k i n d, 
for their infinity is complete within their own sphere, 
but there is more than one attribute sharing e x istence. 
There is only one reality, one substance, one God. God 
contains whatever truly expresses reality, that is, every 
1. ETH, I, def. vi. 
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real thing is a part of God. Spinoza says tha t there is 
no negation in God. This is so bec aus e his conc eption 
o f Go d is that God includes eve r y thing . If we say that 
t h is is God, and that is riot God, we have negation. But 
to say that everythi ng real is a part of God involves 
no n egation. Spinoza held that God is the abs olute 
affirmation of all existence. 
Substance must n o t be thought of in terms of parts. 
Substance is and must b e indivisible, necessarily. The 
ind ividual thing s of reality are not parts divisible 
from the whole of subst a nce. An infi nite subs tance 
cannot consist of an a dditi on of a numb e r of finite 
parts. Two finite numbers cannot equal an infinite 
number. If an infinite substance wer e divided into 
t wo p arts, neither part could retain the p roperty of 
infinitude in t h e absolut e s ense. Each part would be 
limited by the other part. 1 The infinity of substance 
is mor e than a multiplici ty of modes added to gether. 
It i s more than a mathematical infinity. The problem 
of negation is erased by saying tha t substance is a 
continuous whole of all. rea :).. i ty. Sti l ;J- , t~1.is remains 
one of the critic al point s of Spi noza's philosophy. 
In the - light of th:7_s critic ism, it will a pp ear later. 
1. See ETH, I, prop . xiii for argument and proof. 
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The remaining t wo definitions of Book I are additional 
thoughts about the nature of God . A free thing, he des-
cribed as that "which exists solely by the necessity of 
its own nature, and o f which the action must be determined 
by itself alone." 1 Such a b e ing must be God. There is 
no other being with such freedom as this. This bein g must 
be self-caused, governed by nothing other than itself, 
free to act under its own volition without coercion or 
constraint from any other being. The final definition 
is of eternity. Spinoza equated this with existence. 
It 1Nill be remembered t h at ex istence and a self-caused 
being are linked together in the first definition. 
This self-caused being is none other than God~ so this 
last definition affirms the eternality of God. 11 By eternity, 
I mean existence itself, in so far as it is conceived 
nece s sarily to follow solely from the definition of that 
which is eternal" (i.e., God). 2 
Thus we have considered the definitions set forth 
by Spinoza from an analytical standpoint. Following these 
defi nitions are the axioms upon which, together with the 
definitions, the proof of the propositions of Book I 
rests. Let us proceed to analyze these axioms and propo-
sitions, viewing them as much as possible in the way that 
1. ETH, I, def. vii. 
2. ETH, I, def. viii. 
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Spinoza saw their meaning , and suspending criticism of 
his ideas unti l the whol e outline of his arguments for 
the infinity of God is before us. 
Axioms are sup :,:> osed t o be statements of truth 
readily apparent to the human mind vd t hout any stated 
proof. Spinoza presented seven axioms in Book One, 
pr i mari l y concerned with causality. The first axiom 
divides all reality into two groups : that which is 
in itseli' , and that which is i n somethins else--the self-
caused and the other-caused. Spinoza later used this axiom 
to mean that "to exi st in11 equals "to be part of. 11 
This is a part of his basis for claiming that the world 
is all of one subst ~nce. 
The second axiom is closely related to the first. 
A thing that exists in itself must be conceived by 
itself alone. Since God exists in himself, we must 
conceive him directly. Spino za ' s philosophy is God-
centered at this point. Only God may be conceived in 
himself alone. All other things must be conceived in 
terms that ultimately relate to God . But God must be 
thought of directly, that is, by intuition. Spinoza 
started with his idea of God, then deduced the real nature 
of particular things , the modes. 
Spinoza declared further in the third axiom that 
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"From a given cause, an effect necessarily follows." 
VVi thout any cause, there can be no effect. Without a 
First Cause, God, nothing else could e xi st. Since God 
exists, there must be a necessary effect resulting 
from God as First Cause. In the fourth axiom he 
climaxed this notion of causality by saying that "the 
knowledge of an effect depends on and i nvolves the 
knowledge of a cause." To know an effect, we must 
go back to the cause . Knowledge of particular things, 
which exist in something else, depends upon knowled g e 
of the causal agent. Proposition xxiv of Book V 
states that 11 the more we understand par t icular things 
the more we underst s.nd God." Knowledge of particular 
things is ultimately knowledge of God, since everything 
is Part of God , according to Spinoza. Knowledge of any 
particular mode must involve k nowledge of God. 
The fifth axiom that things which are totally unlike 
c anno · be used to explain each other is i mportant in 
Spino z a's proof that there is only one substance. The 
sixth axiom st ates that true ideas must correspon d with 
the ideate. Thi s is .important in interrelations of the 
attributes. The seventh axiom is tha t 11 if a th:hng c a n 
be conceived as non-existing , its essence d oes not 
involve existence." Some self-caused being must 
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be eternally existent t o be the cause of all other thing s 
having a temporal existence. There must be one First 
Cause, God. 
In geometry, onc e the premises are granted , and 
accepted as valid statements, t h e succeeding propositions 
must necessarily be true in the terms of those premises. 
The properties of circles, triangles, rectangles, and 
oth er geometric fi gures are immutable. Problems based 
upon their immutable properties can have only one answer, 
the necessary concl u sion based on the premises. If all 
these premises of Spinoza are valid, then from them fl ow 
i mmutabl e propositions re garding the nature of things. 
Any false proposition coul d n ot b e upheld logically by 
valid premises. But, 1n general , . a true proposition 
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would n ot be supp orted logically 'dy a set of fals e pr emis e s. 
Assu ming that the premises set forth are sound, and that 
the universe is orderly and logically or ganized through-
out , the g eometric method of proof is unshak~ble by any 
complete analysis. But if one o f the premises should be 
prov en false, the ent ire ~tructure of proof woul d topple. 
Spinoza 1 s premi ses must be true i f his s y stem is to be 
valid. 
Thusfar t he basis for Spinoza's system has been 
established and presented. Let us proceed to lay upon it 
the block s of reasoning which he used to reach the upper 
, 
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levels of his system. The case which he presented 
regarding the nature of God and Substance is implicit 
in his definitions and axioms. Spinoza now has all the 
background material he needs to prove his case. The 
propositions and proofs of Book I must st and or fall 
on the basis of these major premises. The terms used 
in tl~ese premises mwst be used in the propositions 
wi t h the same meaning. Inconsistencies in this logical 
system must be ruled out at the start, for they will only 
lead to greater error. We shall continue to seek the 
mind of Spinoza as he presented the propositions of 
Book I, reserving detailed criticism until Spinoza's 
argument is completely before us. 
(1 .·; 
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CHAPTER THREE 
SPINOZA'S PROOF OF GOD'S INFINITY 
In the first fifteen prop ositions of the first 
book of his Ethics, Spinoza presented his proofs con-
cerni n g the natur e of God as infinite. These are the 
most crucial propositions of his entire book: upon them 
rests the v alidity of t he remainder of his philosophy. 
Spinoza has presented his definitions , ideas gleaned 
from the intui t ive operations of his intellect. On the 
basis of these postulates and h is axi oms the burden of 
proof for the succeedin,g propositions is based. Th e 
analysis of these propositions is now very important 
to this study. 
The first propositi on, "Substance is by nature 
prior to its modifications ," is based on t he definitions 
of s u bstance and mode. A mode exists because of the 
subs tance, and thus cannot exis t before that substa nce, 
either logically or temporally. Granting the nature of 
the two definitions involved, this positive proposition 
is logically consistent. 
The second proposition states that "two substances 
whose attributes are differ ent, have nothing in common." 
Spino za started a series of propositions that show there 
can b e onl y one substance in existence. An attribute is 
an elemant of the essential nature of subst a nce, and 
3 8 
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be equated with substance. ThA attributes, when under-
stood to be substance itself as we perceive it to be, 
cannot be pereeived apart from substance. Spinoza contended 
tht two substances which are diff erent in every essential 
quality, i.e., attributes, have nothi ng in common, and 
are totally unlike. He presented as proof the definition 
of substance which requires that substance be conceived 
solely through itself. I f a substance had some attribute 
in common wlth another substance, each might be conceived 
tb~ough the common attribu te with the other substance. 
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The logical answer here too . is just as Spinoza proposed it. 
The third propositi on, ''thing s which have nothing 
in common cannot be one the cause of the other,n makes 
us e of axioms for proof. Axioms IV and V involve caus-
ality and knowledge of related or unrelated subst ances. 
The fi fth holds that things totally unlike cannot be 
understood in terms of each other. On this basis, Spi-
noza determined, with the aid of the fourth axiom t ha t 
know·ledg e of effects must include k nowledge of a cause, 
that one substance cannot cause another's existence. 
The climax of the proof of thi s argument is found later 
in the sixth proposition. 
Spinoza pointed out in the fourth proposition that 
things are called different because of the nature of their 
attributes or their modifications. Spinoza granted no 
~' I .f 
thing s except substance and its modifications, and t he 
understanding. In these respects only can differences 
be determined between things. There can be littl e 
questi on of the truth of this proposition. 
The fifth proposition i s the counterpart of the 
second. In the sec ond, Spi noza showed that substances 
with different attributes have nothing in common. In the 
fifth he showed that substances cannot share a common 
attribute. Renee, if there is more than one substance, 
they cannot have anything in common with each other. 
He proved this on the basis of the preceding proposition: 
that substances must be distinguished by their attribu tes 
or t heir modifications. But since modifications are only 
secondary factors, only the attributes are essential, 
and only the attributes need be considered in this matter. 
If t wo substances have a common attribute, there is no 
way of telling them apart, so they must be one substance. 
This is a vital s ection in the proof of the system. 
It erases the possibility of a multiplicity of substances, 
leaving only one substance. 
The sixth proposition, "One substance cannot be 
produced by another substance," is a more final st a tement 
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of the thi~d proposition. There cannot be two substances 
with a common attribute. Thu s , any such unlik e substances 
have nothing in c o~non, and cannot be the cause of the other. 
.. . 
•::"' r 
The third proposition refers to thing s generally. The 
sixth is a pplied specifically to subs tances. Having 
narrowed the fiel d of the logical number of substa nces 
to one, Spinoza showed that one subst ance could not at 
some time produce another subst ance. This proposi t i on 
needed the four th and fifth propositi on s for proof b e fore 
t h e pr inciple of the third p r oposition could be a pplied 
to substance. 
· The corollary of this proposition is more vit al than 
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the proposition its elf to Spinoza's entir e sys tem . "Substance 
cannot be produced b y anything external to itself." This 
leaves the one conclusion that substance must be self-
caused. If it were caused by something outside of its e lf, 
i t c oul d not truly be a substance, according to t h ese 
.. 
propos i tions, for it would be dependent upon that exter nal 
cause. Spinoza declared that sub s t ances and modes are 
the only forms of exis t ence. Modes depend upon subst ance 
fo r the ir exi stence. One substance cannot produc e another . 
Hence, each subst ance must b e self-caused. It must b e 
compl e tely in itself. This brings up the seventh pr opo-
sition that "exi stence belongs to the natur e of subst ance." 
According to the first definition , a self-caused t h ing 
neces s arily involves existence. Spinoza asserts in this 
seventh proposition the truth of that definition, and 
applies it to substance. He has brought to light that 
substance cannot be caused by anything other than itself. 
The only remaining solution is that of self-causation. 
Spinoza believed that a self-caused being must have 
existence as a necessary attribute. The being that 
has existence as a necessary part of its nature is a 
self-caused being. Substance is a self-caused being; 
therefore, substance must have the essential attribute 
of existence. 
Spinoza declared the infinity of every subst anc e 
in the eighth proposition on the basis of two things . 
There can be only one substance with the same identical 
attribute. Existence has been shown to be an attribute 
necessary to substance. But this attribute can only 
belong to one subst ance. Therefore no other substance 
but one can exist. There is nothing in the infini te 
realm, no other infinite substance pos s ible in exis-
tenee, to limit the infinity of the one substance. 
Subs t ance, furthermore, cannot exist as finite, for 
a finite thing must be limited by another thing of the 
same nature, according to the second definition, of a 
finite thing. Since there is no othe~ being possessing 
the attribute of existence, there is no othe r being to 
limit the infinitude of substance. Indeed, if there were 
several substances, each existing on a finite level, each 
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limiting and interfering with the other, the universe 
would b e come a multiverse, with as ma ny confusing ph enom-
ena as p lague this present world of many ~ov er~ i gn n a tions . 
In a note to this proposition, Spinoza said: 
As finite existence involves a pa~tial negatio~, · 
and infinite exist ence is the absolute affi rmation 
of the given nature, it follows (solely from Prop~ 
VII) that every substance is necessarily infinite. 1 
Substance is given the plac e of the absolute affirmation 
of all existence. Everything which has existence is a 
par t of substance. Nothing having existence can stem 
from anything other than the infinite s ubstance. 
It is int erest ing to note that Spinoza spok e here 
of 11 every11 substance. This is t o allow the possibility 
in the readers' minds t hat . there mi ght be one or more 
t h an one substance. Wnatever the nature of subst ance 
mi ght be, Spinoza wanted to demonstrate here that 
subs t ance alone has existence as its essential nature, 
and that it is infinite. Of course, by this point in 
the a rgument, it is evident t h at Spinoza referred to 
only one Substance, but s i nce t he nature of tha t subst a nce 
had not been clar ified, h e wrote "every subst a nce" to 
include whatever concep tions t he reader mi ght hav e at 
the moment. 
The ninth pr oposition states that "th e more reality 
1. ETH, p r op. viii, note i. 
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or being a thing has t h e greater the number of its attr i-
butes." The being with t h e most attributes, actual, 
potential, or hypothetical, has the greatest real i ty • 
. 
A being with infini t e attributes would be the most real 
of all beings. Substance is the absolute affirmation of 
all existence; thus, substance possesses all the a ttributes 
possible, an infinite numb er of attributes. 
Each attribute must be conc e ived throu gh i t s elf al one . 
It may not be conceived tbrough anything else, accor di n g 
to Spinoza 1 s intuitive definitions. He used this idea 
in the tenth propositi on to show that subst ance must 
be conceived in each of its attribut e s as infinite. 
Each attribute must reveal in itself the infinity of 
sub stance •. 
Now the cl ima x of t hese pro positions is at hand . 
S p inoza equates God with his logically derived being 
called substance, in the eleventh proposition~ ' 11 God, 
or Substance, c onsisting of infinite attributes, of 
which each expresses eter nal and infinite ess enti ality , 
nece s sarily exists." The being po s sessing the most 
attr i b u tes, an infinit e number, each of which expresses 
infinity in its own nature, is t h e hi ghest being it is 
po s s i bl e to conceive. Sinc e we have the idea of such a 
being , it must necessarily exist. This being is God. 
It is our God whom we worsh ip, whatever form of being 
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we conceive him to be. Spinoza found him to be an 
infinite and eternal cause, a self-caused being with 
an infinite number of infinite attributes, thus granting 
to this being the greatest reality possible. At this 
point he has climaxed the logical argument which present s 
God as the Supreme Being, the infinite Substance, the 
one Being in which all other t hings have their existence. 
The substance which Spinoza discussed in the opening 
propositions is actually God, the highest being in the 
universe. God has the greatest number of attributes, 
is eternal, and infinite. All the previous statements 
about substance are now applied to God. This God is the 
Prime Creator, the fundamental cause of all things, 
from whom flows an infinite number of things in an 
infinite numb e r of ways, t he only self-caused being . 
Sin c e exist e nce belongs to his nature, he must be 
eternal, according to the J a s t definition . of Book I. 
Thus, Spinoza presented the eternal and infinite being 
he called God. 
In further propositi ons, Spinoza continued to explain 
t he nature of God. 
Prop. XIII. Subst ance abs ol u tely infinite is 
indivisible. 
Prop. XIV. Besides God, no subst ance can be granted 
or be conceived. 
Corollary I. God is one. 
Corollary II. Extensi on and thought are either 
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attributes of God or (by Axiom I) accidents (affec-
~i~) of the attributes of God. 
Prop. XV. Whatsoever is, is in God, and without 
God n othing can be, or be conceived. 
Prop. XVI. From the necessity of the divine nature 
must follow an infi n ite number of things in 
infinite ways--that is, all things which can fall 
within the s phere of infinite intellect. 
Corollary I. God is the efficient cause of all thdt 
can fall within the sphere of an infinite int ellect. 
Corollary II. God i s a cause in himself, and not 
through an ac c ident of his nature. 
Corollary III. God is the absolutely first cause. 
Prop. XVII • . God acts solely by the laws of his own 
nature, and is not constrained by anyone. 
Prop. XVIII. God is the indwelling and not the 
transient cause of all things. 
Prop. XIX. God and all the attributes of God are 
eternal. 
In this group of propositions, Spinoza refuted the idea 
that the infinite consisted merely in a multiplicity of 
parts too numerous to be counted. God is one being, 
indivisible. The whol e of nature is an indivisible 
Substance . We may claim that we divide Substance by 
cutting an apple _in two. Rather than dividing Substance, 
we would have merely caused a ch ange in one of the modes, 
a f i nite mode. Substance is infinite, not confined to 
or c onsisting of the material world as such, and cannot 
be d i vided. Man could not divide the universe, nor could 
any other being. To think of dividing Substance is to 
think of it incorrectly. 
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The first cause of all this earth and universe, of 
all existence, is God. He is not only cause of the uni-
verse, but also cause of himself. Since he is self-caused, 
he is n ot governed by anyone but himself, nor limited 
in any way by some o ther being. Spinoza furtber declared 
that it is inconceivable that God should limit himself. 
God has an intellect and will, but they are completely 
dif f erent from that of a man. "As, therefore, God 1 s in-
tellect is the sole cause of things, namely, both of their 
essence and existence, it must necessarily differ from 
them in respect to its essence and .•• existence." 1 
Spinoza argued her e that we c annot know a cau s e through 
the study of the effect, because the cause must be different 
from the e ff ect. However, the fourth axiom states that 
we mus t k now the cause in ord er to underst a nd the effect. 
In view of this axiom, it would seem that some knowledg e 
of the cause, God, cou ld be gained by a study of the 
effects, fi n ite modes, e. g ., man. ~here should be, 
therefore, a greater relation b e t ween Finite Man and 
Infinite God than Spinoza seems to allow in his system. 
As the book of Genesis reads, "God created man in his 
own image, in the image of God created he him. 11 2 This 
indicates a lik eness between man and God, between the 
1. ETH,I, prop. xvii, cor. ii, no t e. 
2. Genesis 1:27. 
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finite and the infinite. Spinoza, however, called such 
notions anthropomorphic, and wanted to broaden the gulf 
between the infinite and the finite, disclaim any 
similarity between the human intellect and the divine, 
to exalt the Infinite God. 
Spinoza's claim of the dissimilarity between God 
and the finite did not mean that God is a transi ent 
cause of all existence. He did not create the world 
and then withdraw from i t completely, as the d eists 
teach. Spinoza proclaimed that God is 11 the indwelling , 
and n ot the transient cause of all things." 1 Deism 
.maintains the personality of God, but eliminates his 
active presence in the universe. Pantheism, such as 
Spinoza's denies the personality of God, and emphas izes 
his immanence in the univer s e. Spinoza's doctrines also 
depict the transcendence of God's infinity over the 
finite things which flow from his nature. God is s o 
g reat that he is far above our fi n ite selves. Yet we 
can c ome to an ade quate k nowledg e of his nature. 
rrhe doctrine is good: i nasmuch as it teaches us to 
act solely ac cording to the decree of God, and to 
be partak ers in the Divine nature, and s o much the 
more, as we p erform more ~erfect actions and more 
and more understand God. 
The more we understand God, the more perfect our actions 
1. ETH, I, prop. xviii. 
2 . ETH, II, prop. xlix, corollary , note. 
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will be. This is akin to believing that knowledge is 
virtue • . This relation between God and man will be con-
sidered again in the critical discussion of Spinoza's 
doctrines. 
In the correspondence, Spinoza casts a different 
li ght on the intellects of God and man. Here he 
maintained that the human mind is a part of the in-
finite underst anding . 
As regards the human mind, I believe that 
it also is a part o f nature; for I maintain that 
there exists in nature an infinite power of think-
ing, which, in so far as it i s infinite, contains 
subjectively the whole of nature, and its thoughts 
proceed in the same manner as nature--that is, in 
the sphere of ideas. Further , I take the human 
mind to be identical with this power, not in so far 
as it is infinite and perceives the whole nature, 
but in so far as it is finite, and perceives only 
the human body; in this manner, I maintain that 
the human mind is a part of the divine understanding . 1 
It still remains to be shown whether the human j_ntellect 
has any relation to the divine intellect, for Spinoza 
does not here identify this divine understanding power 
in nature with the intellect of God. Perhaps he intended 
to do so, but did_ not in this case. Thought is an attri-
bute of God, and human minds are a part of t h is attribute 
which he termed the infinite understanding. But he has 
stated in the Ethics that the human and divine intellects 
are not alike. If this is so, perhaps the divine intellect 
is not the same as the infinite underst anding . Otherwise, 
1. Letter XV {XXXII) to Oldenburg. 
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this is a contradiction in the statements of Spinoza. 
Spinoza called the attributes part of the essence of God. 
It might be concluded that Spinoza believed God had an 
intellect apart from the attribute of thought, the divine 
underst anding. The only other alternative is that 
Spinoza was confused on this point and created a contra-
diction in his philosophy. It is on the point of relation 
between the divine intellect and human personality 
that Spinoza has the greatest difficulty in his ideas. 
He denies the personality of God, yet cannot escap e 
that inf inite personality in t aJkking about God's l ove .l He 
objected to the language of the Bible, especially t he 
Old Testament, where God is referred to as a heavenly 
k ing, a ri ghteous judge, etc., in terms of human under-
st anding . This c onception he calls anthropomorphic, 
and degrading to the intellect of a philosopher and to 
God's character. 
According to the Bible account, man was created in 
the image of God, similar to God within the limits of 
a finite being . We must not infer too much about the 
nature of God from our imperfect finite personalities, 
but we c a n believe that God i s ~he perfect personality, 
more than the sum total of the universe, an impers onal 
being, without any feelings such as the joy of love. 
l. ETH, V, prop xxvi must make his God slight l y per sonal 
regardless of the denial of pe rsonality . 
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This is the pri ncipal error in Spinoza's philosophy: 
he denies the personalit~ of God and the personality 
of man in the true sense of the wor d personality. 
Spinoza is right in exal ting his greatness, his infinity, 
his self-caused existence, the unity of the universe 
under divine causation and immanent control , but the 
denial of the pe rsonality of God be co .. es his downfall. 
The conflict of statements regarding the intellect of 
man as related to · the divine intellect are part of the 
difficulty which Spinoza encountered in seeking to evade 
this problem. One cannot evade the truth and arrive 
at satisfactory conclusions . Spinoza built his case 
well , but could not hurdle the personality of God. 
I t cannot be reasoned out of existence. More will be 
said about this problem later. 
Spinoza called God infinite , free from any limi-
tations . There is no being that has the possibility 
of limiting the Supreme Being . It has been argued that 
God is not infi n ite on the grounds that he is limited 
by the laws of logic, reason and. his own nature. 
Spinoza admitted these laws, but did not consider them 
as limiting to the nature of God . The violation of 
those laws would be negation, falsehood , which has no 
reality and therefore could not be in God. God is the 
complete expression of all reality. All that is false 
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is a negati on. Anything which does not follow from the 
necessity of God 's own nature is not real and false. 
God i s perfectly free to express his own nature. In 
tha t lies his infinity. Nothing can restrain the . full 
expression of the total reality of God. Everythi ng 
that is real comes from God. God is under inner 
compulsion to have p erfect expression of hiE! own nature. 
Sinc e it is his nature to be reasonable , logical, and 
rational, he will of necessity express tha t natur e. 
But Go d is not subject to any f ate or chande whatever. 
These are Spinoza 's words on the subject: 
I sho -lld like briefly to explain h ere i n what sense 
I assert that a fatal necess ity presides over all 
things and actions . God I in no wise subject 
to fate: I conceive t h at all thing s follow with 
inevitab l e necessity from the n ature of God , in 
the same way as every one conceives t :-nat i t follo ws 
from God's nature that God underst &nds himself. 
This lat ter consequence a ll admit to follow· 
necessarily from the divine natur e, yet no one 
conceives tha t God is under the compulsion -of 
any fate, but that he underst a nds himself quit e 
freely, though necessarily . 1 
God , then, is infinite in respect to the absence of 
limitations by any exterior force or being~ and ·in 
respect t o his being sole possessor of the attribute 
o~ existence. But the ~act that he acts necess arily 
in accordanc e with his own nature doe s not consti tute 
any limitation to God 1 s infinity. He is infinitely 
1. Letter to Oldenburg , XXIII (LXXV) • 
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free to act according th the necessity of his nature. 
God is the o nly being to be so free from external com-
pulsion, fo r he has complete power over all other beings . 
Inasmuch as God has complete power over all other beings, 
God is infinite. It is a logical necessity that there 
can only be one absolutely infinite being. God is that 
i nf inite being. 
The manner in which God has freedom is to be in 
complete control of all reality and understanding himself. 
Finite creatures may have freedom by aligning thems elves 
wi th the divine laws~ the necess a ry r e quirements of the 
univer se. lffuen we ac t according to his la'NS, then nothing 
can successful l y oppose us. I f our i ntellect is a part 
of the divine understanding , the infin ite understanding, 
then our best func tion, our happiness (laetitia) comes 
when we co- operate with God and attempt to understand God 
more through intellectual love. iiVe are free to express 
our nature in the ways which the necessary laws of the 
universe provide. We are not free to do otherwise. 
Any a ction that is contrary to God ' s will does not 
h av e positive reality. God is perfectly free to act 
according to his own nature, and n o power can ro nstrain 
him from so acting. 
Spinoza' s God is infin i te in the res pec t t hat " what -
soev er is, i s in Go d, and without God, nothing can be, 
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or b e conceived;" 1. nothing exists that is external to 
God; nothing exists that can limit God in any way; God 
is · nfinitely free to act solely acc ording to the necessity 
of his own nature, i.e., if God is good, nothing can 
prevent him from being good at all t i~es; God is the 
indwelling cause of all things; each of the infinite 
number of attr ibutes is infinite aft e r its kind; God 
alone is absolutely infinite; there cannot be another 
absolutely infinite being ; all that there is , is God. 
This completes t he case which Spinoza presented 
in the Ethics and the correspond ence. The basic pro-
positions have been analyzed with a view to underst anding 
rather than criticizing Spinoza 1 s position . Philosophers 
and theolo gi a ns of all g enerations have sought to exalt 
God. ~erhaps none has grasped such a magnificent in-
tuition of the infinity of God as Spinoza. Spinoza 
was overwhelmed by the greatness of God. In his writing s 
he attempt ed to show his belief in this infinite God. 
His metaphysical view is that everything is God: all 
matter is a mo de of the attribute of extension; all ideas 
are part of the infinite understanding , the attribu te of 
thought. The attributes are in compl ete parallelism. 
The modes of thought and extension are dual expressions 
l. ETH, I, prop . xv. 
of the one reality. All of these are part of substance, 
which is God . God is perfectly free to act according to 
his own nature. Th ere is no conf usion in God, but perfect 
order and understanding. God is the most perfect, the 
most real of all b e ings, the Ens Realissimum. God is 
the Being absolutely infinite. 
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CHA.I:' TER FOUR 
INTERNAL CRITICISMS OF SPINOZA ' S PROOF 
The proof that Spinoza presented for the neces sary 
infinity of God has been analyzed. Ac~ording to the 
steps of Spinoza's reasoning, if they are all logically 
consistent, no other conclusions can be drawn than those 
which he has drawn. Time and again Spi~oza offered a 
proposit ion, and then challenged h s readers to supp lant 
it with any other proposal~ I n most cases he i s com-
pletely successful wi th his challenge, for under the 
terms of his propositions, no other conclusions are 
possible. 
everal questions have been raise d about the g eo-
metric method of proof which Spi n oza used. To Spinoza, 
this logical method tho.t proceeds step by step to the 
conclusions was the n atural method to e xpres s the 
necessity for the idea of God's absolute infinity. 
He believed that all things in the 1niverse, all phi los-
ophy, followed necessarily from the nature of God. 
There~ore it was feasible to use a method of writ i ng 
that i n cluded necess ary c onclusions. Bu t this i s not 
the opinion of a ll the subsequent philosophers who have 
read Spinoza ' s Ethics. 
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Spintiza used the geometric form o ly in the Ethics. 
The Short Treatise shows si gns o f the geometric method , 
as do es s ome of the corresp ondence that was written in 
defense of the Ethics. Spinoza used it because he felt 
i t wa s the best method to prove the nece s sary conclusions 
of cosmology. The Tract atus Theologico-Politicus and 
Tracta tus Politicus were not in the proposition-proof 
form, although they did expres s something of the same 
type of argument used in the Ethics . 
One problem of the geometric me thod is the danger 
of bui l d ing a poor foundation for the system. If the 
major premises are false, it is highly probable t hat 
the subsequent conclusions will inv olve errors as well. 
There may be accident a l except i ons to t h is princi ple, 
but inconsistencies will inevi t ably develop somewhere 
in the adv anced structure of the system of thought. 
This ~roblem is accentuated in the geometric method, 
although it may occur in a ny method. A second problem 
is the difficulty of expressing abstract philosophical 
ideas in the concrete form demanded b y the Eudlidian 
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typ e of demonstration. Spinoza had' difficulty wi th the 
form at times, even though he believed strongly in the 
geometric me thod as the best system to show the nece s sity 
of things. A third problem arises for a reader of Spinoza. 
,, 
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It is difficult to interpret the meaning of some of the 
statements in the geometric form. Through this has arisen 
much o f the misunderstanding and conflicting interpretations 
of the doctrines of Spinoza • . 
The geometric method requir es that the terms to be 
used in the argument must be defined first. Then axioms, 
universal truths that need no formal proof, are stated. 
The proof of the propositions is based on these premises. 
Spinoza formed his definitions in a ccordance with ideas 
received through l'l..is hi ghest mental power , t he intuition. 
These definition~ contained the essence of the proofs 
that Spinoza presented in Book I of the Ethics . The 
definitions thems elves were arranged in a manner of 
proof 1ithin themselves. A ques tion may be raised 
whether Spinoza said in the definitions exactly what 
he int ended to prove in propositions based on those 
definitions. This is arguing in a circle. The definitions 
do seem to include the assumption of the conclusions that 
Spinoza was a iming for l n t he propo s i ti·ons . Naturally 
he could prove his point from definitions that were al-
ready fill ed wit h the conclusions . 
The def initions are statements of allege d f act, with-
out any Jroof . They are st a tements that Spinoza h a d 
foi•mulated intu itively . Actually , they were prob ably 
written after Spinoza had written the proofs, or a t 
leas t h ad them in mind. Ueberweg raised a very pointed 
objection to the definitions of Spinoza's Ethics: 
Spinoza has not actually proved t h e reality of the 
subjects of his definitions. Euclid's definitions 
are clear and may be easily followed b y the imagi -
nation--qualities which are almost entirely wanting 
in the definitions of Spinoza, or which, wher e 
figurative expressions are employed (lik e in se esse, 
etc.), are only simulated; some of the definitlons 
of Spinoza t li1{e that of causa sui, etc.) involve 
contradictions. Euclid employs his terms through -
out only in the sense fixed upon in his def initions; 
Spinoza sometimes presents an ar gumentation, the 
first part of which is rendered plausible by the 
employment of expres s ions in their ordinary accep-
t a tion, while in the second part the same expressions 
are repeated in the senses given them b y his arbi-
trary definitions. 1 
In the light of this attack on the definitions, a new 
problem appears. The definiti ons may be correct in 
themselves, but when the premises are used in the pro-
positions, their meaning is changed from the traditional 
concepts to Spinoza's ideas. Ueberweg claimed tha t 
this distortion of the definitions is a major fallacy 
in Spinoza's argument. 
With regard to the origin of the definitions, Ratner 
agrees t i1at they were undoubtedly formed subsequent to 
the working out of the propositions . 
The definitions and axioms to the First Part are the 
ultimate constitutive element s into which Spinoza 
l. Ueberweg, HP, II, 72. 
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found h e could logically res olve his subject-mat ter; 
and therefore that they are the ne c e 2sary and suf-
f ici ent means for the analytical demonstrati on of ·· 
his system of meta.physics. The defini tions and 
axioms are crystallized ou :t of the propositions 
rather than the propositi ons extrac ted from the 
d ef i niti ons and axioms~ 1 
It a ppears tha t Spino z13- ' s definitions are pre judic ed 
in favor of the propositi ons whi ch he derived from them. 
The simple propositions are deri ved s olely from the 
definitions and axioms. The complex propo s itions of 
later argumentation rest partly upon the first propo-
si tions. But they all refer back to the ori ginal 
definitions . The definitions are statements that 
limit the sub ject-mat ter to be considered as included 
in the meaning of a certain term. According to the 
above argument by Ueberweg a g a i nst Sp inoza, it wou ld 
be well if Spinoza had maint ained the original meaning 
accord ed the definitions. Spinoza's def initions are 
certa· nly not so concrete in meaning or so well inter-
pr eted i n the propositions as Euclid 's g eometry . 
A word ne eds to be said about the epis temol ogy 
of Spinoza with reg ar d to how man obtai n s h is know-
ledge of God . Spinoza believed that th..J."' ee k inds of 
~~owl edge exist : the imagination or opinion, reaso n , 
and i n tuition. From the imagination arises all of our 
ideas whi ch are false; reason and i ntuition embrace clear 
1. Ratner, SOG, 7 . 
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and d i stinct ideas wh ich are necessarily true. 1 
I ntuition is the highest type of knowledge. It is dire c t 
knowledge of God. "The highest endeavor of the minO., 
and the hi ghest virtue, is to understand thing s by 
intuition . " 2 Spinoza used his intuition to dis cern 
the truth expressed in the definitions , and the 
e xplanation of those definit ions in the proofs. Our 
knowledge of God is based partly on direct intuitional 
contact wi th the infinite, and partly on the facts of 
experience. "The more we understand particular things , 
the more do we understand God." 3 For from the facts 
o f experience we may reason that God, or Substance 
exist s . The highest k nowledge is gained by intuition. 
This i n tuition eventuates in the intellectual love of 
God. 4 
This intuitive view of ultimate truth may be the 
solution to the problem raised about Spinoza arguing 
in a circle with his definitions and proofs. Such 
circular arguing would become necessary by the f act that 
in t he last analysis, a ll ultimates must:; be analy zed 
and ex pressed in terms of each other. For the defin itions 
l. ETH, II, pnop. xli. 
2. ETH, V, prop. XXV. 
3. ETH, I, prop . xxiv. 
4. ETH, V, prop. xxxiii. 
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to forma proof within themselves is -the natural -thing, 
if they each express truth. Ha~ng expressed the truth in 
his definitions as he - intuitively saw it, Spinoza could 
not put forth any differing principles in the propositions. 
Viewed . strictly from a logical viewpoint, Sp inoza may 
be guilty of arguing in a circle, although p erhaps not 
in any wrong Bsnse. The crucial point of the use of the 
definitions seems to lie with Ueberwe g 's argument that 
Spinoza did not sufficiently prove the reality of the 
subjects of his definitions, and that he may have chang ed 
the meaning of some terms when employed in the proofs. 
Spinoza as s ume d God and his nature, and deduced the 
universe from that starting point. His d eductions are 
not completely self-consistent. Descartes found r eality 
first in himself, then in other individuals like himself. 
From thes e individualities he reasoned that God must 
exist. This latter course of i nductive reason ing has 
advantages. The most certain thing we k now i s our own 
reality~ our own consciousnes s . Without this we c a n know 
nothing. I t must be our star ting point. Spinoza assumed 
the r eality of God, defined God as he believed in his 
intuition, an~ tried to fit all particular things into 
that scheme. On the surface, the division of all things 
into the two classes of that which is God a n d that which 
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flo ws from God , the mode s , a ppears simple and satisfying. 
But reality i s more complex than that. Hu~an personality 
cannot be forced into a mold of the deterministic universe. 
Neither can the personality of God be so confined. The 
definitions of Spinoza are definitely prejudiced in 
favor of his conclusions . It . may be said they are his 
conclusions , and the propositions are explanations of 
those intuitive conclusions. Spinoza 1 s definitions are 
not the final truth. 
Let us turn to the axioms. The axioms are supposedly 
so self-evident that they need no formal proof. Those 
of Eucli d are pl ainly so , but Spinoza ' s are questionable . 
The first axiom relative to things existing in themselves 
or in something else can be applied two ·uays. Does Spinoza 
mean that a t h ing is either caused by i tself or something 
else? The idea which persist s in the propositions is that 
" to exist in" means to be 11 part of." The next three axioms 
are also concerned with causality. The second and third 
are more apparently true than the first. The fourth axiom 
involves a slight contradiction. Spinoza taught that we 
must know God directly,. intuitively. But thi s mus t not 
exclude the po s sibility of knowing God through the modes . 
In thi s axiom, it appears that the finite can give us 
knowledge of the infinite. Spinoza here stated that the 
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k nowledge of an effect involves the knowledg e of t he 
cause. He further insisted t h at finite being s ne~d 
the intellectual love of God in which they know· more 
about God . 1 If finite creatures are caused by God, 
they cannot know themselves without knowing God. 
But then Spinoza objects to thinking of God in terms 
of human characteristics. Does not the effect hav e 
res embl ances of the cause according to this axiom? 
Spinoza used the axiom t o prove the one-ne s s of 
substance, but h e did not remember its i mplication s 
with regard to the k nowledg e of the infinite by the 
finite, and regarding personality, divine and human. 
The fi nite cou ld not, of course, completely underst a nd 
the i nfinite cause. Indeed, a man cannot fully under-
st a nd himself, or any other finite being . 
The fifth axiom that thing s which are different 
from each other in every re s pect cannot be understood 
in terms of the other is derived from a logical prin-
ciple. To distinguish between t wo things, the po i nts 
of similarity or of difference may be considered. But 
total dissimilarity cannot lead to any relati ons of 
k nowl e dg e value. 
The axioms are not all as self-evident as Sp inoza 
thought t h em. By-his intuition, p erhaps they were . so. • 
l. ETH, V, prop . xxxvi . 
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Spinoza used the axioms effectively in his proofs. 
Once they are accepted, they lead into the necessary 
logical process of his propo s itions. Unfortunately, 
however, he did not consider all the problems i nv olved 
in these axioms for the upper strata of his philosophy. 
It is interesting to n ote the log ical arrangement 
of the definitions. First, Spinoza presented his idea 
of self-causation, and related it to existence. Then, 
the finite is described. Substance appears as the self-
caused being that is independent of all other things. 
Attribut es are the qualities of this substance. Modes 
are the finite forms of existence dependent upon this 
substance. The totality of all this is God, the abso-
lutely infinite being. These thi ng s are necessarily 
true. Freedom lies in the unrestrained and necessary 
expr ession of God's nature. Thus, these ideas are 
all necess ary and are eternally so. Spinoza planned 
his definitions carefully, even to the extent t hat 
they prove by their very order what the propositions 
declare in Book I. If Spinoza were questioned about 
arguing in a circle, he would prob ably have replied 
that all these statements are necessarily arranged 
and stated in this manner. It a ppears that Ueberweg 
was essentially correct when he wrote that: 
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The supposed rigorous enchainment of ideas, which 
has been unjustly praised in the Ethics of Spinoza, 
is based, in by far the greater number of cases, 
on defects of clearness and on paralogisms. A g ood 
part of his theorems are far better than his argu-
mentations. 1 
These criticisms of the premises for Spinoza's thought 
reveal the possibility of error in the structure of 
his philosophy. Even though the definitions and axioms 
contain a larg e measure of truth, they must b e used 
consistently and logically. The c omplications wlnch 
evolved in Spinoza's system will be discussed in the 
next chapter, dealing with criticisms by other philos-
ophers and comparisons with their views. 
6 6 
( I .' 
CF-APTER FIVE 
EXTERNAL CRITICISMS OF SPINOZA'S IDEA OF 
THE INF'I N ITY OF GOD 
Numerous philosophers hav e be en concerned with 
the infinite nature of ultimate reality. Spinoza 
expressed his belief in an all-inclusive God having 
the absolut est infinity possible. A comparison of his 
ideas to those of other men is vital in evaluating 
this profound concept of God's infinity. 
The notion of the infinite is shared by many 
thilli{ers. It is typical of religi ou s belief to look 
upon God as infinite. This paragraph from Olin A. 
Curtis is significant: 
There is in a .L l ou.r mor al and religious life 
the conception of the supernatural as the infinite 
beyond nature. This in fi nite is to us a necessary 
stopping place, an almi ghty finality. No man can 
or needs to urg e his thinking beyond the sense of 
the infinite. I do not clai~ that to all men the 
inf'inite means as much as the absolute means to the 
philosopher; but it does mean as much as the first 
cause means to the theist. There is nothing beyond 
it, and it is self-sufficient. Having, then, this 
great conception in his own experience, it is natural 
for a person to use it in dealing with his cosmic 
problem; and so he transfers the infinite t ·o ~he 
Creator of the universe, and now he has a cause that 
is potent, personal, unitary, and uncaused. 1 
This quotation has several points of a greement and of 
d isagreement with .Spinoza. It recognizes that ultimate 
1. Curtis, CF, 102 . 
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causality rests in the self-sufficient infinite being. 
There is nothing beyond or greater than the infinite. 
Furth ermore, it becomes natural, as Spinoza did in the 
eleventh pr oposition, to unite thi s idea of ultimate 
caua.ation with the idea of the infinite God. Thus 
emer g es a cause that is 11 potent, unitary and uncaused." 1 
Curtis goes on to declare that this cause is personal, 
an idea which Spinoza c ondemns as anthropomorphic. The 
matter of personality in God will be seen in later 
comparisons also. 
God, according to Spinoza, is not only infinite 
in his own nature, but in each of his infini t€3 number 
of attributes. In each attribute there is an expr ession 
of every real thing in the universe. A mode of the 
attribute of thought has its parallel in a mode of 
extension, and in any other mode which may exist in 
some other attribute. This is Spinoza's solution of 
the mind-body problem. It is an eter nal paral lelism, 
without interaction between the attribu tes. Each of 
the attributes is conceived independently, yet, in 
some utterly myst erious way the modes of each attr ibu te 
continually chang e in accordance with each other without 
intera ction. Reason demands some vital link between them. 
1. Ibid. 
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Joachim states this about the problem: 
It i s true, Spinoza admits, that each thing i s 
expressed in an infinite number of way s in the in-
finite intellect of God . But since ev 8ry attribute 
is complete in itself and must be conceived per se, 
the ideas of these infinitely different expressions 
of a mode have no interconnexion with one another. 
The problem of interaction mught be raised, but 
since each attribute is independently conceived, 
there is a curious lack of interact ion. By some 
mysterious way, all t hese corresponding mo des 
c han ge in accordance with each other, and yet are 
c onceived separately. The Cartesian pr oblem of 
dualism is thus multiplied to an infinite-ism 
in Spinoza. Can there be some g iant p ine al gland 
catalyzing the interacti on of the many attributes? 
That indeed seems to be the mystery of personality. 
The mind-body problem is enlarg ed to a mind-body-x- x-x 
ad infinitum problem . The core of God himself 
(if there be any such) must be some entity trans-
cendingall these attributes who causeS their 
interrelation. But of course, Spinoza's God is 
an imp ersonal being suc h that a central core, self, 
entity as postulated here would .not exist in his 
philosophical system. 1 
No philosopher has arrived at a completely satisfactory 
solution to the mind-body probl em. Spinoza's solution 
is far from being adequate for solution. It is rather 
a furt h er complication of the matter. 
The solution does not lie in the modes, for they are 
but expressions of the reality of s ub s tance. The natures 
of the modes are determined b y the nature of Substance. 
11 The gener a l charact er of Subst ance is not altered by 
the particular forms which it a ssumes through the modes , 
but the nature of modes ••• is determined by Substance ." 2 
1 . Joachim, SES, 135. 2. Ibid., 17. 
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We cannot k now God by k nowing the modes, but somehow 
we ar e to achieve the intellectual love of God b y 
k nowi ng about him. It would s eem that our sources of 
k nowle dg e are the modes, for with them we have immediate 
contact with the ultimate reality. We know only the 
particulars , not the ultimates. l'ltodes the n, do not 
determine the nature of Subst ance, but Substance deter-
mines what the mod es shall be. Through this we g a in 
k nowledg e of God. 
Spinoza refuted the idea t hat there could b e any 
nega tion in God. However, it is difficult to escape 
from all negati on. Any defining statement made ab out 
God is, in a sense, a negation. If it is said about 
God t hat he is infinite, that is a ne gation of the 
idea that God is not infinite. Spinoza's reply might 
be that 11 That is absurd, for two negations make a 
positive.n There must b e a type o f negati on within 
the framework of reality. As Ueberweg explains: 
The modes of substance do not constitute a 
p ositive a dditions to it. They are, on the 
contrary, mere limitati on s of it, determinati ons, 
hence negations--(omnis determinatio est negat io), 
just as every mathematical body, in virtue of 
its . limitation, i s a determination of the realm 
of infinite extension~ (ne gation of that port ion 
f space which is external to that body). l 
Spinoza cl a imed that God is the complete affirmation of 
l. Ueberweg, HP, II, 66. 
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all existence. This would admit of no negation in God 
of any sort, even that just described. Spinoza distin-
guished between negation and privation thus: 
I say then, first, t ha t Privation is n ot the act 
of depriving, but simply and merely a state of 
want, which is in itself nothing : it is a mere 
entity of the reason, a mode of thought framed 
in comparing one thin&; with another ••• Thus 
p r ivation is nothing else than denying of a thing 
something , which we think belongs to its nature; 
n egation is denying of a thing somethinT, which 
we do not think belongs to its nature. 
Thus there i s nothing which exists that does not 
belong to God. There is no negation in God, nor 
privation, according to Spinoza. But in a sense, 
we limit God by any statement we make about him. 
It wou l d seem, however, that the infinity Spinoza 
insisted upon is precisely that outside of which 
there is nothing. Every idea and every particular 
mode of thought or extension must be about God, for 
there is noth ing else which could be the subject of 
the idea. 11 Intellect, in function fini te, or in function 
infinite, must comprehend the attributes of God and 
the modifications of God , and nothing else." 2 
Another p oint should be mentioned h ere about the 
li~iting n a ture of statements made about God . Spinoza 
held that 11 whatsoever we conceive to be in the power 
1. Letter XXXIV (XXI) to Blyenbergh. 
2. ETH, I, prop. xxx. 
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of God, necessarily exists." 1 Thus, anything wh i ch 
we c onceive about God must already exist as part of 
~od before we could conceive that idea. In this sense, 
therefore, God exists prior to the ideas we have about 
him. Those ideas describe his attributes as they a ppear 
to us, and have no limiting effect upon the real nature 
of God. 
Another way in which God in said to be infinite 
is indivisibility. Spinoza argued that if God were 
divisible into two p arts, then neither part would 
retain infinity. The absolutely infinite cannot 
exist with another being of its same k in9. . Spinoza 
resolved all reality to the One God, to simplify h is 
system of metaphysics. 
Since ultimate reality is only in God, all th:tngs 
are conceived as part of God, indivisible from him. 
All thing s have been created, or brought into being 
just as they are by necessity; that is, God could not 
have done otherwise. All things are nece s sary, including 
the acti ons of man. This drives Spinoza to the con-
clusions that human intellects are part of the divine 
intellect. 
The human mind, in so far as it k nows thi ngs 
1. ETH, I, prop. xxxv. 
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truly as a part of the infinite divine intellect 
(pars est infiniti Dei intellectus) , and its clear 
and-aistinct ideas must therefore be as necessarily 
true as are the ideas of God . l 
It is significant that when the mind does not think 
clearly and distinctly, it does not possess ideas that 
are a part of the divine intellect. Evidently such 
ideas are only partial affirmations of reality and do 
not complete fall within the realm of existence. Con-
fused ideas do not possess existence as reality. 
"Falsity consists in the privati on of k nowledge, which 
inadequate, or confused ideas involve." 2 "Opinion 
is the only source of falsity , reason and intuition are 
necessarily true." 3 "The actual being of ideas owns 
God as its cause. 11 4 That which is false in the ideas 
of men arises from partial knowledg e and opinions. 
Such ideas are not part of the divine mind. The re-
siduum of truth in these ideas would be a part of the 
divine intellect, however. 
Our minds and the thoughts which const i tute them, 
so far as t hey think clearly and thoroughly, are 
parts of that one eternal system of thought. which 
is God viewed under the attribute of thought, just 
as our bodies are parts of that eternal system of 
matter in motion 1N'hich is God viewed un der the 
attribute of extension. 5 
1. Ueberweg, HP, II, 75. 
2. ETH, II , prop. xxxii. 
3. ETH, II, prop. xli. 
4. ETH, II, prop. v. 
5. Webb, HP, 161 . 
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Our re a son or intuition does not participate in f a lse 
ideas, but only our opinion does that. Thus reaso n and 
i n tuition are always parts of the divine mind sinc e they 
only t h i nk ideas tha t are true. Spinoza further declared 
that ev en the human will is determined by God: 
I n the mind there is no absolute or fre e will ; 
but the mind i s determined to wish this or that 
b y a c ause, which has also been determined by 
another cause, and this last by another cause, 
and so on to infinity. l 
Ultimately these causes revert to God, who becomes the 
author of all our choices and acts of will. 
The Calvinisti c doctrine of pre-election, pr edes-
tination, has a parallel in this i d ea of Spinoza' s 
system. This con cept of God complete mastery over t h e 
will of man is in dish armony with the real teach i ngs 
of Chri s ti anity. The very idea of moral obliga tion 
i mplies the possibility of a choice between good a n d ev il. 
Without the fre e will of man to choose betwe en g ood and 
evil, there can be no mora l obligation to do right . 
A further example of how Spinoza believed tha t the human 
mind and will are enchained by divine will is s een in 
t h is pr oposition: "Things could not h ave heen brought 
into being by God in any manner or in any order dif f erent 
fr om that which has in fact obt a ined." 2 · All things 
l. ETH, II, prop. xlviii. 
2. ETH, I, prop. xxxiii. 
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have be en pre-established to be as they are, and could 
not hav e been changed, even by an infinite divine power. 
Spinoza criticized the miracles of Jesus by sayi ng that 
God could not, or would not, depart from the necessary 
order of all things. That would _produce chaos in the 
univer s e~ according to Spinoza. But if God cannot chang e 
this necessary order, it seems to be a limit to his 
infinity . If all things exist by necessity and c ould 
not be changed by the infinite power of God, is there 
not s omething which limit s God to that necessary pattern 
of action? Is this to be found in a Given, a rational 
principle controlling all the actions of God in such 
a way that they cannot vary from that which is pre-
determined? 
It is necessary that God, as such, exist . Th ere must 
be some uncaused Cause, as Spinoza well p ointed out in 
the opening arguments of the Etlucs. But to declare 
that everything exists and acts according to pure 
necessity of causal activity does not corr es pond 'lvith 
the facts of experience. Spinoza is inco.nsistent in 
denying the freedom of God to act, and then declaring that 
whatsoever we conceive to be in the p o wer of God necess-
arily exists . l For if we can conceive of God doing 
something differently, then that woul d necessarily be so. 
1. ETH, I, prop. XXXV. 
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Spinoza's chief difficulty arrises from his attempt to 
mak e the human mind part of the divine mind, and t he 
hu.rnan will completely and necessarily dominated by the 
divine. He accounts for deviations from the divin e will 
by stat ing that they are indistinct ideas and false 
opinions only, thus having no reality. 
This involves Spinoza's doctrines of epistemology 
which are well outlined by Ueberwe g : 
Three k inds of cognition: 
1. Opinio or imaginatio--the development of 
perceptions and of universal notions derived 
from · them, out of the impressions of the sens es. 
2. ratio--adequate ideas of the peculiarities 
of things , or notione s : co~rnune~. 
3. t h e hi ghest, sclentla intuitiva--the i n tuitive 
knowl e d g e which the intellect has of God. 
S i nce the human mind i s a cert a in and d eterminate 
mode of thought, there is no abs olute f reedom of 
the will. The will to affirm or deny ideas is not 
a c auseless, arbitrary act{ it is the necessary 
consequence of the ideas. 
The choices which men make a re thus predeter mined by 
t he i d eas 'l'lhich they have; those ideas or i g inate in God . 
Tak e thi s to it s ultimate conc lusion, and ther e is no thing 
but an automaton universe, completely controlled b y the 
absolutely infinite God. There is no place for love her e, 
intellectual or o t herwise. Personality is completely 
negle cted by the Spinozistic system, both i n God and man . 
This, it will be seen, is his principle er ror. 
1. Ueberweg, HP, II, ?5. 
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Spinoza's doctrine of God's infinity is that nothing 
exists outside of God. I ndividual persons, fini t e minds, 
must exist in God, if they have any reality at all . The 
power of fre e will, moral choices, and moral obligati on 
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are obliterated. The individuality of pers ons is sub ject e d 
to the divine universality. If some element of personality . 
does not b ehave in accordance with these divine princi ples, 
Spinoza v1ould refer to his proposition that "the es s en ce 
of thin g s p r oduced by God does not involve existence. " l 
Basically , this proposition means that thing s which are 
not self-caused are not necess arily existent. Thi.s idea 
must b e contrasted with the proposit i on that things 
neces sarily exist a s they are now, and coul d not be chan ge d 
by God a t any time. Thus the absolute neces s ity of the 
univer se, as Spinoza savv it, break s u p under the inherent 
contradictions of its own system. There are inte~nal 
limit a tions to God's power , according to Spinoz a 's own 
words. Any limitati on i~: a denial of infinity, whether 
it b e fr om within or without. The pantheistic infinity 
of Spinoza 1 s God is not self-consistent. 
Spinoza denied the personality of God in many ways. 
Yet he is continually referring to the "intellectual 
lo\re 11 wherewith God loves himself and we love God. There 
1. ETH, I, prop. xxiv . 
is nothing a ppealing in this coldly rationalistic love 
of which he wrote . Matthew Arnold commented quit .:; sig-
nific antly regarding thi s intellectual love as compared 
with the Christi an meaning of the love of God : 
Spinoza's repeated and earnest assertions that 
the love of God is man's sum~um bonum do not remove 
the fundamental diversity between his doctrine 
and the Hebrew and Christian doctrines. By the 
love of God he does not mean the same thing which 
the Hebrew and CrJ.ristian religions mean by t h e love 
of God. He makes the love of God to consi~t in 
the knovvledge of God ; and as we k now God only 
through his manifestation of himself in the laws 
o f nature, it is by k..n. owi n e:; these laws t hat ".ve 
love God , and the more we k now them the more we 
love him. This ma.y be true, but this is not what 
the Christian means by the love of God. Spinoza's 
ideal is the intellectual life; the Christian's 
ideal is the religious life. Between the two con-
ditions there is all the difference which thare is 
betwe en being in love, and t h e followin g , wi t h 
c.elighted comprehension, a demonstration of :d:uclid. 
For Spinoza, undoubtedly, the crown of the intellec-
tual life is a transport, as for the saint, the 
crown of the rel 1gious 1 fe is a transport; but 
the transports are not the same. 1 
Spinoza took a rather strange attitude toward love, and 
toward all ideas which he termed passions. Our concep-
tions of love and emotions are quite different from his 
views. Ueberweg explains them this way : 
A passi on is as such a confused idea; b~t as soon 
as we form a distinct idea of it, as we always may, 
it ceases to be a passion. The more the mind recog-
n izes all things as necessary the less d oes it 
suffer from passions ••• God is free from all passions , 
1. Arnold, EIC, 220. 
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because all ideas in God are true, and hence ade-
L1u.at e, and b e cause •:vi t h God n o change in point of 
perfection i s possible . God is, therefore, not 
affected wi t h pass ions , j o~ and sadness, and hence, 
also, not with love an d hatred. 1 
The err or her e would se em to be in the ori g i nal definition 
of passions as confused ideas. Truly , God's perfection 
does n ot change in the realization of particular goals. 
But t h is surely does not p rev ent emoti ons , feeling s, 
attitudes in God's consciousness toward that whi ch he 
is doing . Spinoza wanted to defend the perfection of 
God, but included too much in his ideas of what make s 
perfection. God has feelings in h i s super-consc iousness 
ab out the thi n g s which he does. In the words of the 
pro ph 8t Is a iah, 
He was despised and rejected of men; a man of 
sorrows and acquainted with grief: and as one 
from whom men hide the ir face he was despised; 
and we esteemed hi~ not. Surely he hath b orn 
our gr i e fs, s.nd carried our sorrows; yet we did 
este em him stricken, smitten of God, and afflicted. 
But he was wounded for our trans gressions , h e wa s 
bruised for our iniquities ••• and Jehov ah hath 
l a id on him the iniquity of us all. 2 
The Scripture again reveals the feelings of God i n the 
gospel of John: 
For God so loved the world, that he gave his 
only begotten Son, that whosoever believeth on 
Him shoul d not perish, but have eterna l life. 3 
1 . Ueberwe g , HP , II, 77. 
2. Isaiah 53: 3-6, American Standard Version. 
3. St. John 3: 16, American Standard Version. 
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The Scr iptures bear evidence that God feels sorrow for 
the sins of man; that God loves man; that God rejoices 
when man does righteously. The idea of God and suffer-
ing h&.s be :sn viewed differently through the years among 
Christi an theologians. Albert c. Knudson makes these 
comments upon the problem: 
The question as to whether God as wecll as man 
suffers ••• To this question, Augustine re . ~ J.rned an 
emphat ic negative. With hi~ , suffering was t oo 
closely link ed with s in t o be attributed to de i ty. 
But apart from that the early and mediev al t eolo-
g ians and al so Protestant theolo g ians u n til quite 
recently were p-enerally agreed in denying passibility 
to God. One reason was the desire to avoid anthro-
pomorphism, a desire that was accentu ated by the 
cur r ent tendency in philosophy to emphasize t h e 
divine transcenc e ce . Another reason was the 
current conception of t he divine blessedness. 
Suffering seemed to i mply weak nes s , mutabili t y, 
and a perturbat ion of spirit, inconsistent #ith the 
unchangeable perfection o f the divine nature . 
Something there was, of cou rse, i n God that corres-
ponded to the emotional life of man. Otherwise 
God would not have been a God of love and pi t y. 
But the emotions of God were transfigured emotions. 
Th ey were not pas sions. Passions, according to 
Augustine, were movements 11 contrary to r eason" 
and as such coul d have no place in the life of God. 
In this line of thought there is no doubt much 
truth. 'Ne need to be on our guard agB.inst ascribing 
to God the feelings that grow out of our o wn 
finitude. l 
This brings us to a revision of t h e view of all 
emotions as passions. It is truly said that one cannot 
think clearly when his mind is filled with anger. Some 
do not think clearly when in love. There is a s ens e 
1. Knudson, DOR, 185-186. 
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in which emotions are not assi gnable to God's nat ure. 
But there must be something akin to "transfigured 
emoti ons" in order that God mi ght love man. Spinoza 
strongly affirms the love of God for man : 
In s o far as God loves himself, he loves men also; 
the love of God to men, and the intellectual love 
c f men to God are identical. Our salvation, or 
happ iness, or fre e dom consists in constant a nd 
eternal love to God, or in God's love to men . 
The eternal part of the mind is the intell e ct, 
in the use of which only we are active; the 
peri shable part is the imagination! through 
which we are subject to passions. 
Lov e is an activity of persons, of c onsciou s, intelligent 
intellects. I t is difficult to under s tand Spinoza 's 
views on the love of God compared with his views on the 
impersonality of God. 
Henry Sheldon made these remark s about Plato's 
philosophy bearing on the question of the personality 
of God : 
1rPlato," says Zeller, "often speaks of God 
a s a person; and we have no .right to see in this 
on l y a conscious adaptation of his language t o 
t h e popular religious notions. Such a mode of 
represenl:;ation was indispensable to hem on a ccount 
of the immobility of ideas, in order to explain 
phenomena. 11 (Plato and the Older Academy). I n the 
Platonic writings God is described as the only 
author of good, but far removed from any a gen cy 
in t he production of evil; a s unch angeable, in-
c a pable of falsehood, the fairest and best t h at 
is con ceivable, absolutely perfect in all his 
a ttributes; the Father of the universe, who framed 
all t h ings after an eternal and uncha n g e abl e p atter n; 
t he careful Creator and Ruler ••• true measur e of all. 2 
1. Ueberweg , HP, II, 78. 
2. Sheldon, HOD, 15. 
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Plato's theory of the eternal ideas that forill the pattern 
for all existence framed by God has its parallel in 
Spinoza's idea that God could not have created th~ ngs 
in any other way that we might conceive. Seemingly s ome 
super- principles or forms have governed the formation 
of a ll things, according to both Plato and Spinoza. 
God is surely governed by the laws of logic and reason: 
he cannot both do and not do a particular thing . By 
making these eternal Forms part of God's nature, the 
philosophers escape the problem of an external li· i tation 
to God 's i nfinity. 
Thus we are returned to the idea that to be infinite 
means for God to be all inclusive. Such was also the 
view of Aquinas. Etienne Gilson has summarized his ideas 
on God' s infinity as follows: 
Since i n fact God is per se, and since our concep-
tion of God absolutely excludes all non-being, and 
a ll that dependence that would result from non-
being, it follows that in him the fullness of 
existence must be compl e tely realized ••• 
He is a tranquil ocean of substance, integrally 
present to Himself, and for whom the v ery con-
ception of an event would be altogether meaningless. 
But , at the same time, because it is of being that 
God is the perfection, He is not merely its com-
pl ete fulfilment and realization, He is also i ts 
absolute expansion, that is to say, its infinity~ 
I..f we hold to the primacy of the g ood the idea of 
perfection implies that of limitation, and that is 
why the Greeks prior to the Christian era nev er 
conceived infinity, sav e as an imperfection ••• 
The perfection of being not only calls for all 
realisations, it also excludes all limits, g enerating 
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thereby a positive infinity which refuses all deter-
mination ••• For st. Thomas, as for Duns Scotus, it 
is of the very essence of God , as the pure form of 
being, to be infinite ••• The infinity of the Thomistic 
God is precisely that outside of which there is 
nothing. 1 
This writing reveals a great similarity to the views 
of Spinoza on the infinite God. The words of Aquinas 
himself reveal a more striking comparis on: 
It remains therefore to inquire whether infinity 
is bec oming to Him in respect of spiritual ~agnitude . 
This spiritual magnitude is referrable to t wo things: 
n amely, to power and to the goodness or pe r fection 
o f a thing 's very nature ••• But in God t he inf inite 
is understood only ne g ativ ely, because there is 
no bound or end to His perfection, and He is the 
supremely perfect being . For whatev er is finite 
by its nature is confined to some generic notion. 
Now God is in no genus, and His perf ection contains 
the perfections of all genera. Therefore he is 
infinite. Since primary matter is infi nite :tn its 
pot entiality, it follo ws that God , who i s pure act, 
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is infinite in Hi s actuality • •• Being itself, considered 
absolutely, is infinite : for it can be participated 
by an infinite number of t h ing s in an infini t e number 
of ways . Hence if we ta1:{ e a thing with finite Being , 
this being must be lim~ ted by some other thi n g which 
is in some way the cause of that being . Now th ere 
i s no cause of God's being , since He is necess a ry 
of Himself. Therefore, He is I nfinite Being, and 
Himself in Infinite. 2 
'l'hese words from the Summa Contra Gentiles almost sound 
like the words of Spinoza in some p laces. 
Aquinas, like Spinoza, made self-c ausation a necessary 
condition of infi n ity. They further agree that t h ere is 
no being of the same k ind or g enus as God. These ideas 
1. Gilson, SMP, 5 4 ff. 
2. Aquinas, SCG, 94 ff. 
of self-causation and uni queness o f genus do not exclude 
the idea of the reality of finite things. Truly ultimate 
causation cannot but go back to God , the only sour ce of 
eternal existence. But finite things , created things , 
h av e a finite existence, not a sel f -caused exis tence . 
Spinoza claimed in Book I that one subst ance canno t 
produce another subst ance. 1 In this he refers to the 
ultima te reality, the first cause of existence. He 
named the attributes as thou ght and extension, each 
infinite after their kind. These attributes do n o t 
nece ssarily include the attribute of existence. Spinoza 
claims that we know only the two attributes of God, 
thought and extension. Existence is not tha t 1dnd of 
a n attribute. This may be an example of the dual meanings 
7vhich Spinoza applies to terms, in this case, attr ibute. 
It may be that finite things possess existence, 
not in the infinite sen se , but in a temporal sense. 
It s eems necessary to conclude that finite things do have 
a finite ex istence that is not ultimate or eternal. It 
may be everlasting, however, from the time of creation on. 
This would account for the independence of the mi nd and 
will of the human intellect. 
The philosophy of Bruno is also similar to Spinoza ' s 
doctrines on God's infinity. It is easy to find pass ages 
1. ETH, I, prop. vi. 
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in Bruno that compare strikingly with Spinoza. 
For both, the world was in a sense ••• an infinite 
living organism, not created by any outward caus e, 
but having the princ i ples of all its existence and 
all its activities within itself. All being, accor-
ding to Bruno, proceeds from the Infinite. 'I'he 
Infinite is essentially rational and orders t hings 
i n the world, disposing them in the same manner 
a s the human reason connects its ideas. Unl ik e 
Spinoza, Bruno conceived that this infinite basis 
of things is its elf unintelligible to us. "This 
ab solute activity which is the same as the absolute 
p otentiality, c annot be comprehended by the intellect, 
except by negat ion. 11 (De la Causa, Dial. 3). 1 
Al l b e ing must proceed from the infinite, but mus t it 
necessarily conform to the infinite? Spinoza may have 
been reco gnizing the fact that human minds do not always 
agr ee with the infinite mind when he set forth his do c-
trine of the imaginations or• opinions of the hu-nan mind. 
If the human mind has such opinions, it is also able 
t o follow these indistinct or fals e ideas rather t h a n 
a cle~r and distinct idea of reason or intuition. Such 
is free will of men: the power to choose ri ght or wrong , 
false or true. Spinoza cannot consistently both a f fi rm 
t he reality of the opinions and deny t he ability of man 
to live thereby. Dismissing such ideas as false, and 
therefore not real, is not sufficient. Spinoza must 
acc ount adequately for the independence of the human 
mi nd or soul and its power to choose good or to sin . 
1. McKeon, POS, 45. 
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In a pantheistic universe, this i s impossible. But 
since Spinoza's ideas about the infinity of God a gree 
in many respects with these men quoted above, it does 
not appear that infi nity of God is incompatible with 
the free will of human personality. Spinoza holds to 
the absolute infinity of God in actual existence. 
Aquina s a greed with him that God is infinite Being, 
pure a ct, complete affirmation of a ll existence, without 
any potentiality. 
Spinoza did not conc eive God's infinity as a mathe -
matical infinity. Such an infinite being might be divided, 
leading to thi~ problem presented by Josiah Royce: 
An infinite collection, if real apart from know-
l e dge, cou ld be conceiv e d to be altered by depriving 
it of some, or of a considerable fracti on, of its 
constitutive elements . 'l'he coll ection thus r educed 
woul d be at once fini te (since it would h ave lost 
so,ne of its members) and infinite, since n o ·"inite 
number woul d be equal to exhaus ting the remaining 
portion. l 
Royce and Spinoza agree that numerical infinity or the 
quantitative infinity of God is an untenable position. 
Spinoza added to the proof that such a divided infinite 
wo11ld be t wo natures of the same substance, henc e both 
finite . However , Royce did not feel that this I nfinite 
Being c an logically exist as reason has describ ed it 
through the philosophers . His words speak for thems elves: 
1. Royce, WI, II , 556. 
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Is not the complete Infinite the very type of a 
logical ' monster'? I s not the very concepti on 
a self-contradiction? If thought, then, ha 8 to 
conceive Reality as infinite, so much the worse, 
one may say , for thought •••• So space i s for us 
capable of infinite , that is , of indefinite division 
if yau choose to try to take it to pieces • •• 
But such divisibility is a mere possibility . The 
limitless exists, therefor e , only in potentia. 
A numb er actually infinite is contradictory; for 
then it could not be counted; it would have no 
d eterminate size; and it would be so formless and 
meani ngless ••• Any ·#hole of reality is limited 
by its own form, and by the fact that, as an actual 
whole, it is p erfectly determinate . The difficulty 
a s to the infinite must be solved, then, by saying 
that what is real forms a definite, and for t h a t 
reason, a finite totality; whi le within this 
totality there may be aspects which our t hought 
discovers to be, in thi s or that respect, inex-
haustible thr ough any proc es s of counting tha t 
follows some abstractly possible line of our own 
subjective distinctions or syntheses. But this 
endlessness is potential only, and never actual.l 
Infinity for Royce means inexhaustibility. The whole 
of reality is a definitely limited whole, beyond which 
there is nothing. He denies the actuality of an infinite 
being, but affirms t h at it may e x i st potentially. 
All t he foregoing objections to the conception of 
t h e actually infinite rest, in larg e measure, upon 
a true and perfectly relevant principle~ As a fact, 
what is real is ipso facto determinate and i n dividual. 
I t i s this because it is such that No Other can 
tak e its place. 'I' h e Real is the final, the deter-
minate , the totality •• •• Reality, in the final and 
determinate experience of the Absolute, canno t be 
l ess than infinitely we althy, both in content and 
in its order. 2 
1. Royce, WI, II, - 554~55 5. 
2 . Ibid., 563, 569. 
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The very idea of the infinite is the highest, most 
abstr a ct thought of which man is capable. It is the 
c onception of the greatest being, t h e gre a test re ality 
that c s.n possibly have existen ce. It is impos sible for 
men to· ·go beyond this climactic thought. The very 
thought of the infinite is exalting. 
It is psychologically impossible for man to 
face the infinite in any shape without exult a tion • . 
Any positiv e view of the universe beyond my ignor-
ance has power to incite infinite devotion; not 
f a iling to tempt the spirit to an infinite dis-
loyalty to itself. The reconciliation of men with 
such a world is no longer degrading nor disloyal; 
fore the breach which is opened up between man and 
his world by the entrance of the unseen Claimant, 
may be through that same presence completely 
closed. Religion offers science the power an d the 
s timulus to proceed ad infinitum without fear 
of ultimate obstacle. 1 
When f a ced by the mighty infinity of the universe, a man 
beg ins to feel his smallness, his infinite smallness. 
But through the love of God he may fe el his part in 
this wonderful Infinite Reality. 
Alfred North Vfhitehead voiced his opinion on the 
i nfinite as an objection to the idea t hat has been s o 
difficult in the entire history of philosophy. He felt 
that the infinit e wa s a great no t hingness, having no 
reality apart from finite particular existence. A 
summary of Wnitehead's position is here given: 
1. Hock ing , MGHE, 236-237. 
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The superstitious awe of infinitude has been 
the bane of phi l osophy. The infinite h as no pro-
perties . All value is the gift of finitude, which 
i s the necessary condition for activity . 
There are no self-existent finite entities. 
The finite essentially refers to an unbounded 
b a ck ground . Infinitude in itself is meaningl ess 
&.nd valueless. It acquires meaning and value 
by its embodiment of finite entities. Apart from 
the finite, the infinite is dev oid of meaning and 
cannot be distinguished from nonentity. ·-· 
Among philosophers , Spinoza emphasized t he 
fundamental infi nitude and introduced a subordinate 
differentiation by finite modes . Leibnitz empha-
sized the necessity of finite monads and based them 
upon a substratum of Deistic infinitude. Ne ither 
of them adequately emphasized the fact that infinitude 
is a mere vacancy apart from its embodiment of 
finite values, and that finite values .are meaningless 
apart from their relations beyond themselves. 1 
The Infinite Being, then, must have some concrete essence 
or existence with which we can have contact, unless the 
idea should be left vague and empty. Unless God is 
conceived as an Infinite Person, t h ere can be no meaning 
to his infinity apart from finite expressions. And 
perhaps even an Infinite Person would hav e to express 
himself in finite things to achieve any meaning or value. 
Nhat bearing does the idea of a personal Go d have 
n this idea of an infinite God? Can the exalted qualities 
of an infinite Go d be retained in a personal God ·Nhile 
eliminating the blank abstractness t~at characterizes the 
notion of the infinite to Royce and Whitehead? In a 
persona l God we can have contact and confidence. Wi th 
1. Schilpp, POW, 674-675. 
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a personal God, finite p ersons can en joy love and 
fellowship far beyond that intellectual lov e which 
Spinoza advocate s as man 's highest goal ~nd function.l 
The chief problem po i n t ed out in Spinoza's thought has 
been wi th regard to the r elation between the divi n e and 
human bei ngs. Spinoza's pantheism makes all fini t e 
minds a part of the divine, infinite mind, i n sofar as 
they think clear and distinct, or tru~ ideas. The 
personalistic v iew l eaves the i ntellect of human b eings 
out si de the being of God , t hough created by God. An 
explanat ion of t hi s position is g iven by F. Ger ald 
Ensley thus : 
A personal God is not all of reality, as the 
pantheists would make him. He stands in rel at ion 
to finite selves that are not a part of him. What 
is the natur e of this relati on? On the on e hand, 
they are dependent on him, for he is the ir cr eator. 
On the other hand, their very creation means granting 
to them a relative independence of God and an 
alienation of his power from himself. Finite 
selv es wield a measure of self-control and self-
direction . God's purposes do not prevail in men 
b y fiat, as with nature, but as men themselves 
mak e the divine purposes their own. As a moral 
being, God moves his human creatures through in-
fluence r a t her than mechanic ally. 
Personalism ••• accept s the pantheistic view 
that God is inmanent in the universe but conceives 
that immanenc e in voliti onal t erms. Nature is not 
a part of a divine substance but an effect of divine 
will, while man is one with God , not in the sense 
of metaphysical identity, but i n, unity--when man 
so wills it to be--of purpose. 2 
1. Cf . p. 75 above and ETH, V, prop . xxxvi. 
2 e Ensley , Art . 1943 , in Bri gh.tman , PIT, 119 . 
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This concep tion of God does not agree with the idea 
of Spinoza's doctrine of God and his infinity. A personal 
God is bound by the determinateness of his own being, by 
t h e inherent laws of logic and reason, b y the moral obli-
gation to righteousness and holiness. In a sense, however , 
these limitations are akin to what Spinoza meant by saying 
that God acts necessarily in accordance with his nature. 
Spinoza believed firmly in a rational order, which is 
necessary to avoid a chaotic universe. Therefore, God . 
is limited within himself by certain rational pr inciples. 
It goes without saying that a personal God 
such as we have described possesses limitations. . 
For one thing, a personality is a determinate being , 
and as such it is prevented from being its opposite. 
It cannot be impersonal for the same reason a square 
cannot be a circle. Since God is a rational being, 
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he cannot be irrational; he cannot make two and two 
equal five. Since he is a moral being, he cannot 
regard virtue as the same as vice. He is constrained 
to moral conduct in his own life: 11 the most free of 
beings has no choice when he is confronted by the 
best. 11 (McConnell, Is God Limited) As a moral a gent 
there inheres in him the self-limitation that 
c h aract erizes every will--the limitation of its purpose 
(to will A is not to will B), and the limitations 
of moral obligation (it is bound to realize its purpose 
by ev ery consistent means, but to renounce evil means 
to its ends. l 
A personal God is further limited by the finite selves 
that he has created. He has endowed them with the power 
to assert their will for good or evil, although he has 
warned a gainst the ultimate destruction of all evil. 
l. Ibid., 120. 
"God is limited not only by his own n ature but by the 
finite selves which he has caused. Since they are f ree 
beings , they are at liber t y to frustrate the Good whi ch 
he values." 1 
Spinoza accounted for the evil in the univer s e by 
saying that it aris es from the imagination or opin ions, 
the passions of men, and that it consists in fals e , or 
incomplete ideas. Evil is a negative thing , the absence 
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of complete k nowledge . "f'Jith the personal God ther e are 
deep problems of the solution of the orig in of evil. This 
cannot be dealt with fully in this thesis, b u t must b e men-
tioned in connection with the study of infinity. Some 
of the evil is due to the will of man in frustrating 
the Go od which God seek s to achieve through man. There 
is scriptural evidence for the reality of an evil person, 
k nown as Satan, Beelzebub, the Devil, and oth er like names, 
who i s responsible for aggravating and instigation of 
much of the evil both in the universe and in the actions 
of men. The responsibility for creating beings c apable of 
doing evil must rest in God, for he is the Ori gi nator of 
all things. Theologians have battled with the problem of 
protecting the holiness and goodness of God as wel l as his 
infinity in the face of this responsibility. In addition, 
1. Ibid., 121. 
there appears to be in the realm of nature an element of 
discord called natural evil. If it is really evil, u p on 
whose shoulders shall the responsibility for it rest? 
One proposed solution is this: 
In addition to the limitations arising out of the 
determinateness of God's being , there may b e a passive 
or resisting element within his nature--a 11 Given 11 --
which eternally thwarts the divine will and accounts 
for the evil of the world. This is a ~~oint of 
contention among pers onalists. 1 
The Given is fully discussed in Brightman ' s Personal i tx 
and Religion~ - Cf.l . III -and I V, and' A Phi).osophy o f Reli.gion, 
Ch . X, with ·the main argu ments for the reality of the . 
Given. The opposing view in personalism is presented 
by Knudson in The Doctrine of Redemption, 204- 21 2 . The 
follo wing statement s from the Pr~blem of God by Brightman 
relat e the problem of the Given to this current s t udy of 
God's infinity. 
This finite God, who ac h ieves meaning in conflict 
and who shares as a comrade in the struggles and 
sufferings of humanity, may, as we hav e previously 
intimated, be in some remote way ak in to the Hegelian 
Absolute, although p lainly n ot identical -v i th it. 
The contrasts, tensions, and conflicts i n the divine 
nature may be another version of the dialectic prin-
ciple ••• 
The b e st feature of traditional theism, both 
religiously and intellectually, 'Nas its emphasis on 
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the personality of God, which rendere d intelligible 
both the transcendent dignity of the divine self-
existence, namely, absolute rationality, and also the 
relation of God to suffering humanity, namely, absolute 
love. But the attributes of God in that theism, 
1. Ibid., 1 21. 
especially his omnipotence and i mpassibility set him 
far apart from the pains and peri l s o f exper i ence . 
Hence we suggested the hypothesis of the Given ·in 
God which corresponds to and accounts for tb.ose 
factors in experience ~not due to human will) which 
frustrate the attainment of' the highest values • • • 
The Given limits the ·.rlfill and probably the forekno'lv-
ledge of God, wi t hout limiting his goodness or his 
r a tionality or h is p owe r to mold the Given as to 
derive value from it . God would no longer be omni-
potent or omniscient or impass ible; but -he would 
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remain the p erfectly benevolent Creator and the perfec-
tly wise Y..nower of all actual existence. He w-ould 
also be the controlling power of' the universe, 
guiding it through all struggles and delays toward 
an ever-enlarging value. 1 
Obviously, thi s view of a Given in God ' s nature is oppos e d 
to Sp inoza's position of the complete infinity and per-
fection of God 's nahure. The Given is an imperfection 
of God 's nature. From Spinoz~ 's idea of God ' s inf ini ty 
that ther•e is no other substance to liwi t God , no 
other being of the same genus, Brightman's God is 
equally infinite. Th ere is but one God, one supreme 
Being. 
But Spinoza ' s doctrine of infinity includes the 
idea that God is absolutely pe rfect in his entire nature. 
The Given stands as a limit to God ' s omnipotence , in 
order to increase h i s goodness . Since Spin oza has 
earnestly sought to defend God ' s omnipotence, 2 i t is 
apparent that he would not accept this idea of the Given . 
l. Brightman, POG, 191-192. 
2. ETH, I, prop xvii , scholium. 
Ho wever , Spinoza did not mak e an adequate solution 
for the problem of natural evil. The closing note 
of Book One refutes the opinion of men that cert a in 
t h i ngs are evil because they aff ect him adver' sely. 
He derides the idea that God seeks a harmonious uni-
verse. Spinoza wants to view the univer se from God's 
position, rather than by what is good or evi l for man. 
His words are these : 
The perfection of t n ing s is to be reckoned only 
from their own nature and p ower; thing s are not 
mor e or le s s perfect , according as they delight or 
offend human senses , or according a s they are 
serv iceable or repugnant to mankind. To those 
who ask why God did not so create all men, that 
they should be governed only by reason, I give no 
answer but this : because matter was not l acking 
to him for the creation of ev ery de gree of per-
fection from highest to lowest; or, more strictly, 
because the laws of his nature are so vast, as 
to suffice for the production of eve~ything 
conceivable by an infinite intelli gence, as I 
hav e shown in Prop. xvi. l 
Spinoza re ally dodge d the is sues of evil and impe rfection 
in nature . He agrees that God has created some things 
less perf e ct than others. But since all thing s are part 
of God, would not this place imperfection within the 
n a ture of God? Doe s the existence of natural evil 
c onstitute a lirrut to God ' s omnipotence in that God could 
not have created things otherwis e? This conflict, which 
1. ETH, I, appendix. 
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gives rise to the idea of the Given, is n ot adequately 
solved by Spin oz a . An issue cannot be solved by dod g ing 
it or denying its existence . It vvould s e em that Spinoza, 
in recognizing that God has create d some things that 
are not perfect , has concede d the reason for the hypo-
thesis of the Given . Yet he continues to affirm the 
o:m_nipotence and absolute infinity of God. 
Thus the problem of. infinity has been discuss ed by 
some of the philosophers whose thought has bearing upon 
Spino za ' s doctrines. Some thinkers show points of 
similarity, o thers have marked differences and s harp 
oppos i tions . Inconsistenci es within Spinoza ' s philos-
ophy have appeared, especially with regard to the per-
sonality of God and man, their• independenc e , a n d their 
relations to each o ther . The problem of natu~al evil 
is not solved adequately . The relation of Spinoza 
to Christianity remains to be :lis cussed in the next 
chapter . 
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CHAPTER SIX 
SPINOZA 1 S INFINITE GOD COMPARED 'HTH THE 
HEBREW-CHRISTIAN CONCEPT OF AN INFINITE GOD 
The God of Spinoza is very diff e r ent in many 
res pect s from the God of Christian teaching . Spin oza 
openly declares that he does not accept or comprehend 
the Christian viewpoint. This is stated in the Tract atus 
Theolo gico-Politicus and in correspondence, ch iefly. 
Even from the standpoint of ethics, the t vvo are quite 
distant. In the Ethica, Book IV, Spinoza stated t hat humility 
and repentance are not virtues. 
Prop. LIII.--Humility is not a virtue, or do es not 
ari se from reason. 
Prop. LIV.--Repentance is n ot a virtue, or does not 
arise from reason, but he who repents of an action 
is doubly wretched or infirm. 
The Christian views humility as a primary virtue, and 
repentance for sin as a necessary condition for salvation. 
Spinoza based his belief in saying that these are products 
of fear and result in pain to the soul, hence they are evil. 
On the other hand, the virtues of love, self-approval ( n ot 
pride), gratefulness, rationally choosing the greater good, 
acting in good faith, returning good for evil, are virtues 
praised by both Christ and Spinoza. l The whole quest ion 
of ethics cannot be discussed, but it is noteworthy that a 
l . ETH, IV, props. xl-lxxii, and Matthew 5-7 (The Sermon on 
the Mount). 
.: :' I 
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difference does exist on this practical level. Any sound 
ethical system must be founded upon a sound metaphysics. 
Variances in the ethical level indicate similar differences 
in metaphysical premises. Therefore attention must be 
turned to the ultimate reality. 
The Bible is not a metaphysical or theological book . 
There has been much speculation through the centuries about 
its doctrines. The Church has labelled some ideas as 
heresies, while others have been adopted as do gma. Com-
plete agreement upon all theolo gical dogma will not be 
attained on this earth, according to the experiences of 
the history of man. Certain characteristics embraced by 
a majority of Christian believers may be selected, however, 
to form a fundamental conception for compari son with 
Sp inoza 1 s doctrines. 
The creeds of the Churches have mentioned the infinity 
and perfection of God, and of Christ. Credal statements of 
the Protestant Episcopal Church, the Methodist Church, 
the Presbyterian Chur ch, sev eral Lutheran bodies, the 
Church of the Nazarene, and others, acclaim the infinite 
perfection of God. Suc1J. terms as "almi ghty, 1111 everlasting,. 11 
"omnipotent, 11 "omnipresent," "perfect, 11 "omniscient, 11 and 
11 holy 11 are typical of Christian expressions about God. 
The absolut e sov erei o;n t y · of God has been upheld by Augustine, 
Aquinas , Luther, Calvin, Wesley , and countless other s. 
Other ideas about God that a re in commqn wi th Spinoza 1 s 
pos iti on are the goodness , rationality, justice , and love 
of God . 
Spinoza's doctrine of pantheism, the ide a that the 
universe as a whole i s God, does not a gree with Cr~isti an 
belief in a pers onal God. Pantheism re quires an i mpersonal 
absol ute deity . Christianity requires a per s ona l God. 
The personality of God implies individuality that is not 
c ons ist~nt with the universality of panthe ism . The 
theolo gians o f the Chri stian Church have not been pan-
theists . Various philosophers have ranged in t heir 
thinking from the complete tr anscendence of God over the 
uni verse . (de ism) to the complete i nunanence of God (p a n -
theism). The most com ,lon· ground s e ems to b e that God is 
trans c endent in that he control s the universe from above , 
and i mmanent in that he cre a ted it and remains with it 
to mainta in its order . Spinoza denied the accusation 
of Oldenburg that h i s God is nothing mor e thgn the material 
world, but his God is far from the p er sona l God of the 
Christian position. Sp i noza 1 s words of defense ar e : 
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For I hol d that God is of all t hings the c ause immanent, 
as the phrase is , and not transient. I say that all 
things are in God and move in God , thus a greeing with 
Paul , and, perhaps, with al l the anc ient phi losoph ers , 
though the phras e ology may b e different • •• The supposit i on 
of some that I endeavor to prove in th~ Tractatus 
Theologi~_Poli ticus the unity of God and Nature 
(meaning by the latter a certain mas s of corporeal 
matter), is wholly erroneous . l 
A vast difference still remains between an impersonal 
Absolute and a personal Jehovah-God . 
I n another criticism of the Christian religlon, 
Spinoza assails the practice of seekin g a basis of faith 
through belief in miracles, which he calls ignorance . 
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The r eal basis o f faith s ou l d be true reason and intuition, 
accordi n g to Spinoza. He makes Chr istianity little better 
than a superstition. He believed that Jesus Christ was 
a supreme manifestation of the true ·v'fisdom, in which 
we must believe. But he did not understand what was meant 
by the incarnation of God : 
I do not think it is necessary for salvation to 
k now Christ according to the flesh : but with regard 
to the Eternal Son of God, that is, the Eternal 
-i isdom of God , which has manifested itself in all 
things and es pecially in the human mind , and above 
all in Christ Jesus, the case is far otherwise. 
For without this no one can come to a state of 
ble s sedness, inasmuch as it alone teaches what is 
true or false, good or evil. 2 
Spinoza's idea of Cbristology is similar to present day 
unitar ianism and liberal theology. 
The determinism of Spinoza's God is also 0 9posed to 
Christian teaching . Spinoza declared that thing s could not 
have been created in any other way than they have been. 
l. Letter XXI (LXXI I I) to Oldenburg . 
2 . Ibid. 
.JJ 
I ' 
10 1 
Everything is determined accordin~ to a fixed natural 
law that cannot be changed. The Calvinistic teaching 
of election and predestination is akin to this deter-
minism. Calvin's view of the sovr e i gnty of God also 
denies free will of man, insofar as salvation is c on-
cerned. Ultimate salvation is bestowed arbitrarily 
and irresistably by God's will and grace. Unlike 
Spinoza, Calvin believed i n a reality of sin and its 
complete domination of the human heart before salv at i on. 
The Arminian and Wesleyan theology, which includes 
the doctrine of the free will a g ency of man in moral 
choices, is more in harmony with personalistic philosophy. 
This latter theological position i s the interpretation 
followe d in this thesis. Spinoza, Calvin and Arminius 
each emphasize t he soverei gnty of Go d .. For Arminius this 
does not include domination of the will of man by God, 
as for Calvin; nor does it include metaphysical u nity 
of the mind of man with the divine intellect. Persons are 
created by God with the power of choice to live according 
to God's will or not, to love God or not. Disobedience 
to God, sin, results inevitably in death, unless it is 
forgiven by the grace of God through rep entance and faith 
of the sinner. Finite persons are not subject to the 
determinism that Spinoza ushers into the scene of life. 
r ~ ·-·· '·.•. _;1 
Note the effect upon morality of a deterministic 
system. If the results are all predetermined, what is 
the purpose of morality and conscience? If there is no 
moral judgment or settlement, where is the virtue in 
good living ? The theory of determinism is untenable in 
a moral universe. In his ethical system, Spinoza 
seems to indicate a choice between good and evil is 
possible, but it is not in harmony with the principles 
of his metaphysics . 
The Christian regards sin and evil as disobed ience 
to God . It is followed by a feeling of guilt and fear 
of punishment, invariably. For Spinoza, evil is only 
a negation of good, a lack of k nowledge, arising apart 
from rational principles in the imagination. It is 
true that goodness is reasonable, but sin is more than 
a lack of reason. Sin is a definite action that goes 
a gainst true reason. Spinoza stated his position on 
the nature of evil thusly: 
For my own part, I cannot admit that sin and 
evil have any positive existence, far less t h at 
anything dan exist, or c ome to pass, contrary to 
the will of God. On the contrary, not only do I 
assert that sin has no positive existence, I also 
maintain that only in speak ing improperly, or 
humanly, can we say that we sin against God , as in 
the expression that men offend God. 
Again, we cannot say that Adam's will is at 
variance with the l aw of God, and that it is evil 
becaus e it is displeasing to God ; for besides the 
fact that grave imp erfection wou l d be imputed to God , 
or that he desires anything that he does not attain, 
10 2 
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or that his nature resembl e d that of his creatures 
in having sympathy with some thing s more than others; 
such an occurrence would be at complete variance 
with the nature of the divine will . The -·rdll of God 
is identical with his intellect; hence the former 
can no more be contravened than the latter . 1 
This position is diametrically opp osed to the Biblical 
account of sin. Typical expressions of sin against God 
as fou n d i n the Bible are these : 
1 0 3 
So should you sin a g ainst the Lord your God . ? 
Thy word have I hid in my heart that I mi gh t not 
s in a gainst thee . 3 
Indeed, I have sinned a gainst the Lord God of Israel. 4 
The Lord, he a gainst whom we hav e sinned. 5 
Neither do I condemn the e , go and sin no more. 6 
This Christian doctrine is that men can sin agains t God, 
but t h eir disobedience will be punished , unless i t i s 
for giv en by rep entanc e and faith in Christ who di e d for 
ou r sins to be for given. 7 The mark of judgment against 
sin is unmistak able in the Bible. So also are the rewards 
for l oving God. God has ~iven to man the fre e p ower to 
will to liv e ri ghteously or to sin. Spinoza c anno t h ol d 
t o this position, since he also b elieves tha t the human 
intell e ct i s a part of the divine intel l ect . Sin c anno t 
b e a part of the nature of God. Once a ga i n it i s ev i dent 
that this confusion of the met a physical natures of the 
human and divine intellects is a major error in S pinoza's 
thought. 
1. Letter XXXII (XIX) to Blyenbergh. 
2 . Deuteron omy 20:18 . 
3 . Psalms 119 : 11. 
4. Joshua 7 : 20. 
5. Isaiah 4 2 :24 . 
6 . St. John 3 :11. 
7. I Cor. 15 : 13; 
He'5'rews 9 : 2·9 . 
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Spinoza continued i n the letter referred to above 
with regard to the nat ure of Scriptures that ascribe 
human characteristics to God : 
I observe that Scripture, being chiefly fitted 
for and beneficial to the multitude , speak s popularly 
after the fashion of men. For the multitude are 
incapable of sublime conceptions • •• They constantly speak 
of God as resembling a man, as sometimes angry, some-
times merciful , now desiring what is future , now 
j ealous and suspicious , even as deceived by t he 
devil; so that ph i losophers and all who are above 
the law, that is, who follow after virtue, not in 
obedience to law, but through l ove , becaus e it is the 
most excellent of all things, must not be hinder e d 
b y such expressions. l 
It is true that God deals with men through parables 
and metaphors because they cannot fully apprehend the 
depths of spir i tual truth otherwise . Jesus was the greatest 
user of parables in his ministry . But it must be under-
stood that a parable is oni.by a symbol of a much greater 
reality . Christianity a grees that love is the greRtest 
of all things, as Paul testifi ed in I Corinthians 1 3 : 1 3 . 
Love is the only motive around which a human personality 
may be or ganized. Fear is a disor ganizing motive . But 
the punishments for sin are unavoidable . Occasionally 
only the fear of punishment can bring men face to face 
with God, and lead to salvation, and the love of God. 
Spinoza adv ocated a life above the control of the 
emotions and passions. His plea is that they are contrary 
to reason. In actual life, emotions are a vital p art 
1. Letter XXXII (XIX) to Blyenbergh. 
the human personality. True, they are allowed to 
dominate life excessively in some persons . However, 
it should not be denied t h at they are an integral part 
of normal personality . Bondage to emotions should be 
av o ided, but not a complete avaidance of their expression. 
Spinoza called an emotion a disturbance of the spirit. 
11 An emotion, which is a passion, ceases to be a passion 
as soon as we form a clear and distinct idea of it." 1 
By a rational grasp of the necessity of all things, 
we are able to abolish all emotion, theoretically, for 
that is the true spirit of the intellectual love of God. 
Since God is capable of only clear and distinct, rational 
ideas, he is absolutely free from passions. Spinoza 
c ontinu e d his proof saying that the more we understand 
and rationalize our behavior, the more we shall understand 
and love God. But we cannot expect God to love us in 
return. 2 The Christian doctrine is that God loves us, 
and gave his life in Christ to save us from sin and 
reconcile us unt o himself. The greatest scriptural text 
for this thought is the classical John 3:16. The entire 
life of Christ is a demonstration of the love of God for 
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sinful men. Men turn to God because they find the need for 
1. ETH, V, prop. ii. 
2 . ETH, V, prop. xxi. 
and the availability of the love of God for them. 
This love of God is a soul-transforming power. 
Much as men may seek to live by their consci ence a nd 
in a rational way , they cannot succeed in ri ghte ous 
living without the po wer of God in their hearts. Men, 
left to themselves without· the vitalizing p ower of God's 
love, do evil, contrary to their best reason. The 
atrocities of the t wo holocastic wars of this century 
are indicative of the horrors of living agains t t h e 
principles of God. Leaders of Germany, Italy, Jap an, 
and now Russia have denied and rejected God . The folly 
of their position and the destruction 'Nhi ch follows is 
k nown to all. Tne love of God for men is an e ssential 
element of life. Spinoza avowed that hatred must be 
conquered by love. God is the source of love. For him, 
it is the intellectual love of an Absolute Being, a 
rational understanding of the nece 2sity of riature, a love 
that cannot expect returns from this Infin ite Being. 
For the Christian, love is the highest function of man 
and God . But it is a mutual love, s l'1ared between persons . 
Love is the power of a person, not an impersonal Absolute . 
There is little appeal in the love of which Spinoza wrote. 
The appeal of the love of the Christian God touches the 
whole life, including the emotions, and is rational. 
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This Cb.Distian way is the true way of life and love of God. 
In these ways , Spinoza disagrees with the Christian 
pos tion . That Christian pos i t ion expressed in com-
parison with Spinoz a is founded on Armini an and Wes l eyan 
conc ept s of Christianity . Cert ain views of Spi noza 
have been s h o\ n as contr adicting other interpret a tions 
of Chri s tianity. Complet e agre ement i n Christian doctr ne , 
as in ph::. losophy, i s not to b e found on this earth, and 
with all probability will not be a chieved in the present 
order of things. Howeve:c· , each person must adopt i n 
faith that which for him comprises a practical absolute , 
a do ctrine t hat is most satisfactory t o his thinking , and 
that leads him to know and lov e God. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
CONCLUS IONS ON SPINOZA 1 S CONCEPT OF GOD ' S I NFINITY 
Spinoza made a sincere effort in his philoaophy to 
emphas ize the exaltedness of God, the perfection of God, the 
infinite magnitude of God, the absoluteness of God . It 
must be agreed with Royce that man stands in reverent awe 
in the presence of the infinite. This conception of the 
infinity of God staggers the human mind in imagination, 
reason, and intuition. We cannot fully apprehend the 
infinity of God, but an adequate k nowledge is possible. 
Spinoza 1 s concept of God is stimulating to the mind. 
The simple statement that God is 11 a Being absolu tely 
infinite 11 l brings one to an admiration of that great 
Being ~ together with a profound consciousness of one 's 
o wn infinite smallness. 
~Vho can tell the infinite greatness of even t he 
physicel universe? The greatest telescopes man has 
devised have not reached out to the full extent of it. 
It is seemingly infini te in extension. Who can tell 
the power encl osed within even the .minutest electronJ 
Scientists ar e only beginning to unlock the power held 
within the atom. In the physical universe there is an 
undeniable evidence and revelation of an Infinite Creator. 
1. ETH, I, def. vi. 
i I f. ,, 
It might be said that all of reality i s a complete 
unit, and hence finite in that it is perfectly determinate 
within the limits of its own being. In another sense, 
this asserts the infinity of Reality, for there can be 
no other to limit it be equal existence. This is Spinoza's 
position : there is no other Substance in existence 'Nhich 
can limit God by its existence, for God includes everything 
that is real. There is no limit to the extension or the 
thought of God. God is the absolutel y infinit e b eing . 
Since man can have such a conc ep tion of God, and ideas 
are c aused only by real thi ngs , then the reality o f the 
Infinite God must be assumed (the ontological argument, 
basically). Spinoza point ed out the absolute perfection 
of God's nature. Nothing false or negative can b e in 
God's nature , which is the absolute affirmation of all 
existence. This exalted view of God captures the wonder 
of the intellect . However , this alone does not pr oduce 
the love of God as k nown in Chri s tian teaching s . 
If God ' s nature includes within himself all that 
exists, then the human mind must be included within God. 
Spinoza's absolute being is an impersonal being , yet 
it is said to contain human pers onality. Personal i ty is 
the greatest creation of God. If effect s cannot be greater 
than the c aus e, then God too must be a person . A p ers on 
may be defined as a self-conscious being . Spino za agree s 
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that God perfectly underst ands himself. Surely God is 
self-conscious . Intellect, Reason, and Love are functions 
of a. person, not an abstract impersonal Absolute. 
Spinoza ack nowledged that there are some elements of 
human personality that are false, evil , bound by passions. 
This i s not to be found in God, however . Evil i s a 
ne gativ e thing . The affirmation of existence in a 
finite creature is that part of him which is in God. 
That which is false or evil is not real. Suppose that 
a person were partly real, partly unreal. If he comes 
to understand his passions and act rationally, he 
achieves more reality, and adds to the total rational 
reality in God . But that would be absurd to Spinoza, 
for God c~~not be added to; he is perfectly complete. 
Everythi ng is determined by God; human volition has 
no place in Spinoza's philosophy; all ls bas ed on the 
law of cause and effect. The r eality of sin and evil 
is apparent in human life. The power of choice b e t •Neen 
g ood and evil is given to man. Human minds cannot be 
a p art of the divine intellect, although they may com-
prehend some of the same thoughts. Personality, human and 
divine , is the greatest problem in Spinoza's philosophy~ 
Spinoza has been charged with a denial of religion. 
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He was excommunicated from his Jewish synagogue f or heresies. 
Certainly he denies many Hebrew and Christian concepts 
of religion and God . Spinoza defended himself in these 
words : 
But I would ask, whether a man throws off all 
reli gion, who maintains that God must be ack now-
led~ed as the highest good, and must, as such 
be loved with the free mind: or again, that the 
reward of virtue is virtue itself, while the 
punishment of folly and weak ness is folly itself? 
or lastly, tha t every man ought to love his 
neighbor, and to obey the commands of the supreme 
power? Such doctrines I have not only expressly 
stated, but have also demonstrated them by very 
solid reasoning. l 
Truly Spinoza did not deny true religion. Be conceived 
Christianity to be the religion of high principles, many 
of which he upheld and sought to establish by the soundest 
reason possible. But Spinoza violently objected to the 
superstitious, as he called it , element of Christianity. 
The mystery of tha Incarnation of Christ was not under-
stood at all , hence denied by him. Perhaps some of his 
objection to superstitions of Christianity arose from the 
practices of the Roman Catholic Church in his day. In 
another letter he objected strenuously to that false 
brand of Christianity : 
Do you set it down to pride and arrogance, that 
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I employ reason and acquiesce in this true Word of God, 
which is in the mind and can never be depraved or 
corrupted: Cast away this deadly superstition, 
acknovvled g e the reason vvhich God has g iven you, and 
l. Letter XLIX to Isaac Orobio. 
l ,. £! ! ~ I 
follow that, unless you would be numbered with 
the brutes . Cease, I say, to call ridiculous 
errors mysteries , and do not basely confound those 
things which are unknown to us , or have not yet been 
di scovered, with what is proved to be absurd, like 
the horrible secrets of this Church of yours, which, 
in proportion as they are repugnant to right reason, 
you believe to transcen d the understanding . 1 
Spinoza upheld the principl es in Christianity tha t he 
believed were the elements of true reli gion . Others 
he rejected boldly. In view of the degradation of the 
Catholic Church, Christianity's largest group of nominal 
adherents, during Spinoza's day , it is not diffucult 
to understand a reason for his adverse opinion of 
Christianity in many ways . Spinoza earnestly sought 
a trus ethic for living, based on a sound me taphysics. 
He embraced many truths about God and man, but , as has 
been shown, confused his ideas about personality, both 
human and divine. A completely satisfactory ethics 
cannot be founded on such a metaphysical position. 
· S oinoza proved t h e compl e te soverei gnty of Go d and 
the infinity of God from the standpoint of his sur passing 
all other beings , including all reality withi n himself. 
But he did not achieve a c ompletely satisfactory philosophy 
since he denies the personality of God , and engulfs the 
personality of finite men in the abstractness of the 
1 . Letter LXXIV (LXXVI) to Albert Bur gh . 
112 
Infini t e Being. The divine relationship with men is 
a personal one. It is a continual struggle to fr ee men 
from their depraved, evil condition. Pringle-Pattison 
aptly described this relationship: 
This is the conclusion ••• no God, or Absolute, 
existing in solitary bliss and p erfection, but a 
God who lives in the perpetual giving of himself, 
who shares in the life of his finite creatures, 
bearing in and with them the whole burden of their 
finitude, their sinful wanderings and sorrows, 
and the suffering without which they cannot be 
made perfect. We must interpret the divine on 
the analogy of what we feel to be profoundest in 
our own experience. The divine omnipotence 
consists in the all-compelling power of goodness 
and love to enlighten the grossest darkness and to 
melt the hardest heart. i.ive needs must love the 
highest when we see it. It i s of the essence of the 
divine prerogative to seek no other means of 
triumph--as, indeed, a real triumph is possible 
on no other terms. 
God ••• the eternal Redeemer of the world. 
This perpetual process is the ver y life of God, 
in which, besides the effort and pain, He tastes, 
we must believe, the joy of victory won. 1 
God is the Perfect Person who continually expresses his 
infinite being in love to finite man. 
Spinoza said, "By God, we me an a Being supremely 
perfect and absolutely infinite." 2 There cannot be 
a greater concept of the infinity of God than Spinoza's. 
He adequately proved that God exists as the First Cause, 
that his greatness in all of his attributes is infinite 
beyond compr ehension. God is the most real of all beings. 
1. Pringle-Pattison~ IOG, 411-412. 
2 . Letter II to Oldenbur g . 
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It is unfortunate the Sp i n oza dl d not grasp the reality 
of God as the Perfect Person, lovi ng and caring for 
finite persons which are the hi ghest being s of his 
creation . Finite creatures cannot become equal to or 
great er than the Infinite God. No being can equal him 
and limit h im in that vro..y. There can be only one 
Supreme being . Finite men cannot abrogate the will 
of God wi thou t punishment , but they are fre e to r ealize 
and reciprocate in the fellowship and love of God the 
Father, the Infinite Personality. The love of the 
Infinite, Supremely Perfect God is the greatest thing 
in Reality. 
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ABST RACT 
The fundamental principle of t h e philos ophy of 
Benedict de Spinoza is the necessary and absol u t e infinity 
.· 
of God . He defined God as an absolutely infini te being . 
This concept is the starting point of his philosophy . 
All of his thinking is God-centered . Th e proof of his 
principle of infinity is presented in the Ethics , Book I. 
Spinoza began with an intuitive not i on of God . 
He expressed his intuitive bel i efs i n definitions and 
axioms to begin the structure of his philosophy . The 
propositions and proofs which follow are rational ex-
planations of the intuitive definitions . The reality 
of God is proven by the necessity for a F i rst Cause , 
a self-caused being . The infinity of God i s affirmed 
because God is the only substance which can possess the 
attribute of existence. There is no other being of the 
same kind as God; theref ore no t hing exists which c an li~it 
God. Al l particul ar things flo w necessarily from the 
nature of God . All reality is in God . Everything that 
is , is God . 
Once the premises of Spinoza ' s philosophy are 
granted, the log ical step s of his proof of infinity 
and the nature of God follow necessari l y . The geometric 
method makes the premis es hi ghly import ant. Spinoza 
intuitively conce i ved his definit i on of God . From this 
definition he proceeded to form his entire philosophy 
by deductive reasoning . There is nothinp; which doe s not 
follow necessarily from God ' s nature . 
The infinity of God means the c omplete affirmation 
of all existence . Everythine; real i s a part of God. 
All things are present to the eternal ly perfect God . 
God eternally causes , by his omni potence , the r eal ity 
of everything which is in his infinite intallect. God's 
power, will, and inte l lect are one . God has the power 
to cause anything within his infinite intellect , and 
necessarily vills to do so . Spinoza rejecte d the Car-
tesian :i. dea of crea t i ve , metaphysical cause on the 
grounds that i t would destroy Go d ' s omni potence . Either 
God would not be able to cres te everything in his 
infinite intellect, or , if he could do so, he would 
then be able to create nothing more. Hence h is infini ty 
and omni p otence vvoLlld be destroyed . Ther·efore Spinoza 
unites will , int ellect , and power . But Spinoza did 
not consider that an i nfinite cannot be exhausted. 
The i nfinite intellect cannot be exhausted by the i nfinite 
power. Th e power of the infinite is to continually create 
as it chooses to do so . 
Many philosophers have discussed the notion of the 
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i nf inite . Aquinas agreed ·,1\Ti th Spinoza that God is infinite. 
This infinity is understood only ne gatively, for there is 
no limit to his perfection. Bruno concurs that all being 
proceeds from the infinite. Royce ohjected to the term 
"infinite" as being a complete abstraction, a log ical 
monster .ri thout definite meaning . Infinity means inex -
haustibility to Royce . 'Nhit ehead claimed that the infinite 
Bei ng achieved meaning only in the finite and particular . 
One of the chief errors in the philosophy of Spinoza 
i s the denial of the personality of God . Secondly , he 
included all things within the nature of God , including 
human personality . In the necessary, determined order 
of things , human personal ity is denied moral freedom. 
Errors withi n the human intellect are made a part of 
the divine intellect. Such i s not consist ent with the 
teaching that there is no i mperfection in God . 
Spi noza denied that anything can ha _i)pen to frustrat e 
the will of God . There is no such thing as sin a gainst 
God . Evil is only negative--the absence of true knovvledge . 
It arises from the imaginat i on, not reason or intuition. 
Spinoza denied the reality of natural evil. Things are 
not evil merely because they are contrary to man 1 s ,Nell-
being . There is no re a l natur al evil for Spinoza . God 
had sufficient matter to create every level ~ f perfeDtion . 
But since everything is a part of God, and God is perfect , 
why are not all things p erfect? Spinoza dodged any real 
answer to this pr oblem. Althous h he denied the reality of 
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natural evi l and i mperfection within God , the notion 
pers ists. It appears to be akin to the Given as proposed 
by Edgar S . Brightman to explain natural evil . Spinoza's 
solution for the problem of evil, both in man and nature, 
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is not adequate . It stands as a problem to infinity of God . 
Spinoza disagreed fundamentally wi th Christianity. 
He denied the personal i ty of God essential to the Christian 
faith . He did not comprehend the meaning of Christ 's 
incarnation, but believed that Jesus perceived and tau ght 
the h i ghest t ruths . Spinoza objected to irrati onal beli e f 
in miracles and mysteries as a ba~is for faith in the 
Infinit e God . He rejected the idea of sin, and denied 
the freedom of the hum.an will to choose g ood or evil . 
The Christian doctrine of salvation is .by for giveness 
of sins th~ough repentance and faith. Spinoza d enied the 
possibility of sins a gainst God, and condemn ed repentance 
as pain, or evil resulting from fear. Spinoza and 
Christianity agree that love i s the highest f unction of 
God and man . But Spi noza 1 s intellectual love consisting 
in the mental comprehension - of the neces s ary truths of 
the universe is not to be compared with the glorious 
love of the Christian God which is s hared and reciprocated 
by f init e men in a personal uni on of spirit iVith the 
infinit e God . 
Spinoza ' s concept of God ' s infinity is perhaps the 
greatest concept held about God . It is exalting to 
think about the Infinite God. Tha t Infinite God can 
achi eve real meaning , however , only as he i s the Perfect 
P erson. erfect Personality does not limit the being 
of God . This is the highest concept of God possible. 
The hi ghest functi on of man is to participate in the 
Infinite Love of the I nfinitely Perfect Person of God . 
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